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INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA”).1 Six years later, Congress reauthorized VAWA2 in part to
“address[] residual immigration law obstacles standing in the path of
battered immigrant spouses and children seeking to free themselves from
abusive relationships . . . .”3 Over the last ten years, VAWA’s provisions
have enabled over 20,000 battered immigrants to gain secure immigration
status in the United States.4 Nevertheless, this Comment argues that the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) has
frustrated VAWA’s success by failing to administer VAWA remedies for
1. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1902, Title IV (1994) [hereinafter VAWA I] (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
and 204 I.N.A.). The Act attempts to provide cohesive federal solutions to address the
problem of domestic violence.
2. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1464, Division B (2000) [hereinafter VAWA II] (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 204 I.N.A.). This section extends funding for VAWA I
programs and addresses gaps in protection for certain victims of domestic violence.
3. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,195 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (recognizing the need to
prevent abusers from using immigration law to prevent battered immigrant women from
leaving them).
4. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, PROTECTING IMMIGRANT SURVIVORS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND OTHER CRIMES, at http://www.national
immigrationproject.org/Factsheet%20Immigrant%20Survivors.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (detailing numbers of VAWA
claims).
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limited English proficient (“LEP”) immigrant individuals, particularly
women,5 in accordance with the Constitution, civil rights proclamations,
and congressional intent.6
The United States admits hundreds of thousands of immigrant spouses
every year,7 and a significant number of them will become victims of
domestic violence at the hands of their U.S. citizen (“USC”) or legal
permanent resident (“LPR”) spouses.8 The USCIS, formerly known as the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), has a legal obligation to
provide linguistically appropriate services that enable LEP women to
access VAWA remedies.9 This responsibility arises under Executive Order
13,166,10 which extended to federal agencies the obligations of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”), prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of national origin.11 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
which prevents the arbitrary denial of liberty interests,12 and the Equal
5. VAWA also applies to male spouses. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,193 (daily ed. Oct.
11, 2000) (emphasizing VAWA’s gender-neutral language). Nevertheless, this Comment
focuses on battered immigrant women because the discriminatory administration of VAWA
benefits impacts immigrant women more severely because of two important facts. First,
legally-admitted spouses are mostly female. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM,
LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SETTING PRIORITIES 51 (1995) (specifying that women made up sixty
percent of USC spouses immigrating to the United States for fiscal year 1994). In 1994,
two-thirds of LPR spouses were female. Id. at 64. There is also significant statistical
prevalence of male violence against women compared to female violence against men. See
NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, NATIONAL STATISTICS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
INFORMATION, at http://www. ndvh.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (on file with the
American University Law Review) [hereinafter NDVH STATISTICS] (quoting Department of
Justice statistic that in ninety-two percent of domestic violence incidents, men commit
crimes against women).
6. See infra Parts II-III (arguing that USCIS’s administration of VAWA violates due
process, Executive Order 13,166, and congressional intent).
7. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, at 20 tbl.4 (2002) (noting that the United States admitted 294,798 immigrant
spouses
of
U.S.
citizens
in
2002),
available
at
http://uscis.gov/
graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/immigs.htm; id. at 21 tbl.5 (indicating that the United
States admitted 28,874 immigrant spouses of legal permanent residents in 2002).
8. See Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources
and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 250 (2000) (reporting that thirty-four percent of immigrant
Latinas experience domestic violence in a study conducted by the Immigrant Women’s Task
Force of the Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and Service).
9. See infra Parts II-III (addressing USCIS’s obligations under the Fifth Amendment
and Executive Order 13,166).
10. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (clarifying that Title VI required
federally-funded agencies to provide LEP accommodations and extending such obligations
to federally-conducted agencies as well).
11. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, §§ 601-602 (1964) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000d) (prohibiting recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating
on the basis of race, color, and national origin when providing services and authorizing
federal agencies to establish regulations to achieve these objectives); see also Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (affirming the prohibition of language discrimination as a
form of national origin discrimination under Title VI).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting deprivation of “life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law”).
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Protection Clause, which provides equal protection for similarly-situated
individuals, fortify this responsibility.13
In order to create programs that enable battered immigrant women14 to
be safe from abuse, it is important to recognize barriers that operate within
cultures to impede women’s access to available immigration remedies,15 in
addition to accessibility barriers shared by all battered women.16 However,
even culturally-appropriate strategies may fail to reach LEP battered
immigrant women because of institutional barriers that systematically
exclude them from access to services.17 By adopting the perspective of an
LEP battered immigrant woman,18 this Comment attempts to expose the
13. See id. amend. XIV (barring a state from denying “any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”); id. amend. V (providing for due process to prevent
arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954) (extending equal protection guarantees to federal acts because discrimination
constitutes a deprivation of liberty under the Fifth Amendment).
14. Immigrant domestic violence advocates commonly use this term, but it does not
imply that battered immigrant women form a homogenous group. See LETI VOLPP,
WORKING WITH BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN: A HANDBOOK TO MAKE SERVICES
ACCESSIBLE 2 (Leni Marin ed., 1995) (noting that immigrant women are diverse in terms of
race, sexual orientation, class, length of residence in the United States, and myriad other
social attributes). This Comment concentrates on women who are in legally-recognized
marriages to USC or LPR men, who do not yet have permanent immigrant status, who speak
little or no English, who do not have economic or logistical access to legal representation,
and who are eligible to self-petition for VAWA remedies. See infra Part I.B (describing
May, a hypothetical battered immigrant woman who will guide the reader through the
VAWA application process); see, e.g., Zelda B. Harris, The Predicament of the Immigrant
Victim/Defendant: “VAWA Diversion” and Other Considerations in Support of Battered
Women, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (noting that a typical client at the Domestic
Violence Law Clinic in Tucson, Arizona is a “poor, recently immigrated, non-English
speaking woman with children”).
15. See VOLPP, supra note 14, at v (offering practical advice to domestic violence
service providers so that they can be more culturally sensitive and reduce barriers to access).
See generally SUDHA SHETTY & JANICE KAGUYUTAN, IMMIGRANT VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: CULTURAL CHALLENGES AND AVAILABLE LEGAL PROTECTIONS (Feb. 2002)
(noting that family and community resistance, fear of official institutions, and improper
program
design
may
bar
women
from
services),
available
at
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/vawnet/arimmigrant/arimmigrant.html.
16. See VOLPP, supra note 14, at 3-4 (describing tactics that batterers use against
women, including coercion, threats, isolation, and physical, sexual, emotional and economic
abuse).
17. See Leti Volpp, On Culture, Difference, and Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U.J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 393, 398 (2003) (arguing that focusing on cultural barriers rather
than institutional ones ignores the racism of agencies and removes the pressure from them to
make services accessible); see also NANCY MEYER-EMERICK, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT OF 1994: AN ANALYSIS OF INTENT AND PERCEPTION 102-08 (2001) (arguing
that VAWA normalizes certain types of violence and may discourage women from
accessing assistance); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245-51
(1991) (critiquing intervention strategies that are solely based on the experiences of women
who do not share the same race or class background).
18. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (explaining that the perspective of
those on “the bottom” who have experienced discrimination is essential in order to
understand how systems fail to provide justice). Despite this paper’s focus on language, the
discrimination an LEP battered immigrant woman faces based on her lack of English-
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discriminatory nature of USCIS’s facially-neutral VAWA application
procedures and assess the efficacy of language access laws in gaining
USCIS’s compliance.
This Comment argues that USCIS violates Executive Order 13,166 and
due process by continuing its English-only administration of VAWA in a
manner that fails to provide LEP battered immigrant women with
meaningful access to remedies, and excludes from protection the very
individuals that Congress intended VAWA to embrace. Part I provides an
overview of USCIS’s VAWA and language access obligations and how
May, an LEP battered immigrant woman, is unable to access VAWA
remedies because of language barriers. Part II outlines due process
requirements and argues that USCIS’s current failure to provide languageaccessible services violates LEP battered immigrant women’s heightened
due process rights to access VAWA remedies. Part III argues that USCIS’s
administration of VAWA remedies fails to provide meaningful access for
LEP battered immigrant women such as May, and reviews May’s options
for enforcing USCIS’s obligations to her under Executive Order 13,166 and
the Equal Protection Clause. Part IV recommends ways in which USCIS
could improve LEP battered immigrant women’s access to VAWA and
suggests how Congress could strengthen USCIS’s compliance. This
Comment concludes: (1) USCIS’s current administration of VAWA is
constitutionally inadequate because it deprives LEP battered immigrant
women of their liberty interest in VAWA remedies without due process;
(2) USCIS violates Executive Order 13,166 because its policies fail to
provide meaningful access to LEP women; (3) even though USCIS’s
actions constitute intentional discrimination against LEP applicants, it is
unclear if May has a means to enforce USCIS’s obligations under
Executive Order 13,166; and (4) Congress should act to close the loophole
whereby USCIS can evade judicial enforcement of its obligations to LEP
battered immigrant women.

proficiency is interwoven with that based on her gender, her class, her race, and her
immigration status, and will vary according to her particular social location. See also Mari
J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) (recognizing that “no form of subordination ever stands alone”).
See generally Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for
Reform After “9-11?”, 7 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 315, 316 (2003) (describing “pernicious
and institutionalized racial barriers in U.S. immigration laws”); Joan Fitzpatrick, The
Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration Policy, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23, 48 (1997)
(discussing how U.S. immigration policies disregard “adverse gender-specific effects”);
Olivia Salcido & Madelaine Aldelman, “He Has Me Tied With the Blessed and Damned
Papers”: Undocumented-Immigrant Battered Women in Phoenix, Arizona, 63 HUM. ORG.
162 (2004) (discussing how undocumented immigration status intersects with and reinforces
violence against women).

MORGAN.OFFTOPRINTER

490

8/9/2005 1:11:04 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I.

[Vol. 54:485

BACKGROUND

A. The Violence Against Women Act
After four years of congressional hearings about the social impact of
violence against women,19 Congress enacted the Violence Against Women
Act as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 (“VAWA I”).20 Subtitle G of VAWA I specifically provided
protections for battered immigrant women and children.21 Subtitle G gave
USCIS the authority to grant immigration benefits to battered immigrant
women married to abusive USC or LPR husbands without the abusers’
knowledge or consent.22 Prior to this provision, abusers had considerable
power over their wives’ immigration status because there was no exception
to the statutory requirement that the LPR or USC spouse file immigration
paperwork on behalf of the immigrant spouse.23
Recognizing the need for women to be able to adjust their immigration
status independently of their abusers, VAWA I created two new types of
relief for battered immigrant women.24 The first is self-petitioning, which
allows women eligible for spousal immigration benefits to petition for
permanent residency without the cooperation of their abusers.25 The
19. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 112-66 (1994) (recognizing the need for the
federal government to address the pervasiveness of violence against women and including
protection for immigrants in Title IV, Subtitle G); H.R. REP. NO. 103-395 (1993) (reporting
favorably on H.R. 1133, the Violence Against Women Act of 1993, and providing
protection for immigrants in Title II, Subtitle D); S. REP. NO. 103-138 (1993) (amending S.
11 and explaining the scope and validity of the civil rights remedy for victims of violence);
S. REP. NO. 102-197 (1991) (substituting language for S. 15, the Violence Against Women
Act of 1991, to include a civil rights remedy); S. REP. NO. 101-545 (1990) (amending S.
2754, the Violence Against Women Act of 1990).
20. See VAWA I, supra note 1, §§ 40,001-40,703 (funding educational and social
programs, and modifying domestic violence criminal treatment).
21. See id. at Subtitle G (amending procedures in Section 204 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (“I.N.A.”) for credible evidence waivers, self-petitioning, and suspension
of deportation for battered immigrant spouses and children).
22. See id. § 40,701 (establishing self-petitioning for battered immigrant spouses and
children); see also id. § 40,703 (detailing relief for battered immigrant spouses and children
in deportation proceedings before an immigration judge).
23. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., HOW DO I REMOVE THE CONDITIONS
PERMANENT
RESIDENCE
BASED
ON
MARRIAGE?,
at
ON
http://uscis.gov/graphics/howdoi/remCond.htm (last modified May 7, 2004) (on file with the
American University Law Review) [hereinafter CONDITIONS] (specifying the standard
procedure whereby the couple petitions for immigration benefits jointly to avoid USCIS
initiating removal proceedings). See generally Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration
Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593 (1991) (discussing the
incorporation of sex-based discrimination and male domination in immigration laws and its
impact on women).
24. See VAWA I, supra note 1, at Subtitle G (amending the I.N.A. and authorizing
services to lessen violence against women). See generally Mayabanza S. Bangudi, The
Violence Against Women Act, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 489 (2002) (summarizing the
provisions of VAWA I and VAWA II, including those for battered immigrant women).
25. See VAWA I, supra note 1, § 40,701 (providing an exception to standard
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second is suspension of deportation, which provides a means for battered
immigrant women in deportation proceedings to stay in the United States.26
Congress recognized that the immigration protections of VAWA I
contained some serious oversights and left some battered immigrant
women vulnerable and without an immigration remedy.27 Congress
attempted to address this lack of protection with Division B of the Victims
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“VAWA II”),28 Title
V of which is entitled the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of
2000 (“BIWPA”).29 BIWPA improved procedures such that it authorizes
self-petitioning for a battered immigrant woman provided that she married
a USC or LPR in good faith, and that her husband subjected her to battering
or other extreme cruelty.30 BIWPA also improved relief for suspension of
deportation (renamed cancellation of removal)31 and established a new Uvisa option for violent-crime victims, providing an option for battered
immigrant women who otherwise would be ineligible for VAWA relief.32
However, VAWA II is silent on issues of language access for the
beneficiaries of its immigration remedies, implicitly entrusting the

conditional residency procedures).
26. See id. § 40,703 (allowing battered women of good moral character who have been
in the U.S. for three years to obtain relief where deportation would cause extreme hardship).
27. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,192 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of joint managers)
(noting inadvertent immigration barriers that allow abusers to wield power over women’s
immigration status and thus hinder women’s safety and ability to leave); see also Cecelia M.
Espenoza, No Relief For the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered Immigrants Lost in
the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 163 (1999) (arguing that the intersections of
VAWA I and the criminal justice system re-victimized battered immigrant women); Deanna
Kwong, Removing Barriers for Battered Immigrant Women: A Comparison of Immigrant
Protections Under VAWA I & II, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 145-49 (2002)
(reviewing the omissions of remedy for battered immigrant women who were divorced or
not legally married, who had received public assistance, or who had any criminal
conviction).
28. See VAWA II, supra note 2 (strengthening law enforcement, services, and
education for domestic violence).
29. See id. at Title V (improving access to immigration benefits and addressing
shortcomings of VAWA I).
30. See id. § 1503(b)-(c) (revising VAWA I eligibility requirements to include women
who unknowingly entered into bigamous relationships, had divorced their abusers because
of violence, or whose spouse had died or renounced citizenship before the petition); see also
id. § 1503(d) (allowing women with certain criminal histories, such as mandatory arrest for
violence committed in self-defense, to qualify under good moral character requirements).
But see, e.g., Harris, supra note 14, at 15-23 (describing the unintended consequences of
mandatory domestic violence prosecution on a battered immigrant woman’s VAWA
eligibility); Kwong, supra note 27, at 152 (noting lingering problems with VAWA access
for women who cannot show marriage to a man legally resident in the United States).
31. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1504 (changing treatment of service of Notice to
Appear so that it no longer terminates a continuous residency period and eliminating time
limitations on motions to reopen removal and deportation proceedings).
32. See id. § 1513 (providing immigration relief for otherwise ineligible battered
immigrant women who report the crime to police, participate in the investigation, and help
with the prosecution of the perpetrator).
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equitable administration of VAWA benefits to USCIS.33 As a result,
broader statutory and constitutional obligations define the parameters of
USCIS’s obligations to LEP battered immigrant women.34
B. The Story of May, an LEP Battered Immigrant Woman
To understand how USCIS’s administration of VAWA impacts
individual applicants, consider a scenario involving May, an LEP
immigrant woman who married a USC named John last year.35 May is one
of forty-seven million foreign-born people in the United States who speaks
a language other than English in the home.36 May is also among the 1.5
million women per year who are victims of domestic violence in the United
States.37 John began beating May soon after they got married, and it is
possible that if she does not leave him, he might kill her.38 Congress
enacted VAWA to offer immigrant women improved protection against
domestic violence and to allow them to obtain immigration relief.39 A
foreign-born person has a greater likelihood of a favorable result on her
immigration application if she can speak English or if she can get help from
someone within the legal system.40 However, May does not have anyone to
33. See id. at Title V (detailing amendments to I.N.A. without addressing means to
implement the new provisions successfully).
34. See infra Part I.C.1 (reviewing Title VI provisions prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of national origin); infra Part II.A (summarizing procedural due process rights as
applied to LEP individuals’ rights to language accommodation).
35. May is a hypothetical LEP battered immigrant woman who will help guide the
reader through the VAWA process. See infra Part I.B (describing the barriers that May
faces at each step of the VAWA application process). See generally Joann H. Lee, A Case
Study: Lawyering to Meet the Needs of Monolingual Asian and Pacific Islander
Communities in Los Angeles, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.: J. OF POVERTY L. & POL’Y 172
(2002) (discussing the real-life experiences of a Korean LEP battered immigrant woman
attempting to obtain help); Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 1262-64 (detailing the real-life
experiences of a battered immigrant Latina attempting to access domestic violence services).
36. See HYON B. SHIN & ROSALIND BRUNO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE AND
ENGLISH SPEAKING ABILITY: 2000 2 (Oct. 2003) (noting that this number represents
eighteen percent of the total population ages five and over who do not speak English at
home), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf; id. at 2 fig.3
(reporting that according to the 2000 Census, 28.1 million U.S. residents speak Spanish, two
million speak Chinese, 1.6 million speak French, one million speak Vietnamese, 0.7 million
speak Russian, and 0.6 million speak Arabic).
37. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
SURVEY 2 (1998) (approximating 1.5 million rapes or physical assaults on women annually
by intimate partners based on results of a telephone survey of 8,000 men and 8,000 women).
38. Cf. NDVH STATISTICS, supra note 5 (quoting DOJ statistic that intimate partners
murdered 31,260 women between 1976-1996); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE, 1993-2000 (last revised Feb. 23, 2003) (reporting 1,247 women killed by
partners in 2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs /abstract/ipv01.htm.
39. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(2) (improving remedies to enable women to
bring charges against abusers without immigration consequences).
40. Cf. Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment,
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 473-74 (1992) (noting that in asylum cases, an
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help her, and she is having a great deal of difficulty accessing the benefits
offered by VAWA.41
1.

Language barriers to accessing VAWA information
When John was out, May tried calling the USCIS customer service
number to explain her situation, hoping the representative could advise her
on any immigration relief that is available.42 However, this option did not
work for May because neither the voicemail prompts nor the live operators
were available in a language she could understand,43 so May hung up.44
May went to the local library to access the Internet in the hopes of finding
out basic information about her situation.45 However, the USCIS Website
was entirely in English and the lone “TRANSLATE” link at the top of the
page simply led to a page of dense English text suggesting May use a free
online translation service.46 The machine-translation service mangled the
translated text so badly that May could not understand what it meant,47 so
May gave up.48
May never got to see that the Website also provides a referral to the
VAWA-funded National Domestic Violence Hotline (“Hotline”).49 The
Hotline has advocates who can provide assistance in English and Spanish
and can access telephone interpreters in 139 languages.50 Unfortunately,
applicant who has a similar education level, social class, and political orientation as the
immigration judge has a much stronger probability of a favorable outcome).
41. See infra Part I.B (describing the barriers May faced in accessing VAWA remedies
without outside assistance).
42. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NATIONAL CUSTOMER SERVICE
CENTER, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/NCSC.htm (last modified May 6, 2004)(on
file with the American University Law Review)(describing how to access live operators and
detailing available automated information, such as office locations, how to get forms, and
basic immigration benefits, but excluding any information on VAWA).
43. See id. (asserting that the nationwide service provides “consistent, accurate
information and assistance,” and is available in English and Spanish, but omitting any
reference to availability of language interpretation for other LEP customers).
44. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an LEP woman hung up when
an English-speaking legal services intake worker did not understand her).
45. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., HOW DO I APPLY FOR IMMIGRATION
BENEFITS AS A BATTERED SPOUSE OR CHILD?, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/howdoi
/battered.htm (last modified Oct. 31, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review) [hereinafter HOW DO I?] (providing details of VAWA’s legal foundation,
eligibility, and application process in the FAQ section under “Family”).
46. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., TRANSLATION INFORMATION, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/translate.htm (last modified July 15, 2003) (on file with the
American University Law Review) [hereinafter TRANSLATION] (referring visitors to free
translation Websites such as AltaVista’s Babelfish).
47. See Tongues of the Web, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 2002, at 26 (noting that the “rough
and ready” quality of machine translation has not improved much in thirty years).
48. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an LEP battered immigrant
woman gave up trying to get help because of language barriers).
49. See HOW DO I?, supra note 45 (referring petitioners to the Hotline phone number 1800-799-7233 and TDD 1-800-787-3224 for information on shelters, mental health services,
legal advice, and information on self-petitioning).
50. See NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, NDVH SERVICES, at
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the USCIS Website fails to mention this important fact, and, to make things
worse, it buries the referral phone number five screens down in the middle
of a background paragraph.51 Furthermore, the Hotline is unable to provide
legal assistance and only can refer May to another agency for further
help.52
The lack of language accessibility at USCIS may explain why battered
immigrant women like May usually seek information from other women in
the community, immigrant advocacy organizations, domestic violence
agencies, or immigration professionals.53 Some domestic violence and
community organizations have made efforts to provide language-accessible
services to VAWA applicants.54 However, the fact that May can seek
information elsewhere, or can obtain language-accessible information from
other sources, does not relieve USCIS of its obligations to LEP women.55
2.

Language barriers to completing a VAWA application
A community member gave May a copy of the VAWA application,
Form I-360,56 but it was available only in English and May could not
understand it.57 Additionally, May was not sure that I-360 was the right
form since it did not say anywhere that it was for a VAWA claim, even
though this is the name by which May knows this type of relief.58 The
language of the form hindered May’s ability to access VAWA remedies
because, in order to apply, she had to struggle through five pages of
http://www.ndvh.org/services.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (on file with the American
University Law Review) [hereinafter NDVH SERVICES] (detailing how the federally-funded
program attempts to provide Title VI compliant services).
51. See HOW DO I?, supra note 45 (advising domestic victims to contact non-profit
organizations, including the Hotline).
52. See NDVH SERVICES, supra note 50 (explaining that advocates will refer callers to
legal agencies in their local area).
53. See Dutton, supra note 8, at 247-48 (analyzing help-seeking behaviors of Latina
domestic violence victims and finding that they tend to access informal networks and social
services rather than going to government or law enforcement agencies).
54. See, e.g., FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE WOMEN’S
RIGHTS PROJECT, at http://www.endabuse.org/programs/immigrant/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (providing information on
battered immigrant women’s issues and translated materials on domestic violence).
55. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federal agencies to
provide LEP individuals with equivalent services to those provided to English speakers); 6
C.F.R. § 21.5(a) (2004) (recognizing the obligations of DHS programs under Title VI to
provide non-discriminatory services).
56. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., PETITION FOR AMERASIAN,
WIDOW(ER), OR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT (Sept. 11, 2000) [hereinafter FORM I-360] (allowing
designated categories of immigrants to petition for special visa classifications), available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/i-360.htm.
57. Cf. Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an LEP woman failed to get legal
help because she could not fill out an English language restraining order form correctly).
58. See FORM I-360, supra note 56, at Instructions 1 (stating that an applicant may use
the petition to classify an alien as “a Battered or Abused Spouse or Chid [sic] of a U.S.
Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident”).
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instructions in college-level English and fill out a four-page, ten-part
application form.59
May had to send in evidence with her application.60 May could not
figure out which English-language documents would be appropriate
evidence,61 and it was difficult for her to obtain some of them without
arousing John’s suspicion or anger.62 Many of the documents May needed
are only available in English, from agencies or organizations that may have
little LEP accommodation to assist May in her quest.63 Additionally, May
had to send all supporting documentation in English, and she was unable to
find someone who is competent to translate her foreign language
documents and who could certify that the translation is accurate.64
Thus, May’s ability to access, and possibly to obtain, VAWA relief
depended upon her English language abilities. The following section
explores how USCIS’s English-only provision of VAWA information
contravenes the intent of Executive Order 13,166 to ensure meaningful
access to applicants irrespective of LEP status.
C. USCIS’s Language Access Obligations Under Executive Order 13,166
There is no explicit provision in VAWA on language access for LEP
women, so a threshold question is whether an agency policy that effectively
excludes LEP immigrant women like May is contrary to congressional
intent.65 Even though May is eligible for LPR status based on her familial

59. See id. at 1-9 (providing application information for VAWA self-petitions). If May
overcomes these initial hurdles, she still may think she cannot apply because USCIS has not
updated the form to include the revised eligibility criteria from VAWA II. See id. at
Instructions 1 (specifying that the form’s revision date is September 11, 2000). In fact,
according to the language used on the form, many eligible women would think they are
ineligible for benefits. See id. at Instructions 2 (including eligibility requirements of current
marriage to the abuser and current residence in the United States: criteria that VAWA II
specifically changed).
60. See id. at Instructions 2 (noting that an applicant should file “credible relevant
evidence of eligibility” with the self-petition).
61. See Dutton, supra note 8, at 258 (noting that 78.7% of battered immigrant Latinas
spoke or read little or no English).
62. See VOLPP, supra note 14, at 5 (detailing the hiding or destroying of important
papers as a means of exerting power and control over the battered spouse).
63. See FORM I-360, supra note 56, at Instructions 2 (specifying that appropriate proof
includes marriage certificates, utility receipts, mortgage documents, police reports, medical
reports, and bank records).
64. See id. at Instructions 1 (specifying English language requirements for all parts of
the application package).
65. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (noting that where congressional intent on a particular issue is facially clear, both the
court and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress”). Where Congress has not spoken directly to the issue in question, the court will
defer to an agency’s own interpretation, as long as the statutory interpretation is reasonable.
See id. at 844-45 (finding valid both explicit and implicit congressional delegation of
authority to agencies).
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relationship with her husband,66 under ordinary circumstances she would
need John to file a form and request removal of her “conditional”
immigration status.67 John has threatened not to file the necessary
paperwork,68 and May is afraid that the government will deport her if she
leaves her husband.69 However, Congress clearly intended to extend
VAWA remedies to battered immigrant women like May, and she could
thus apply for immigration relief under VAWA’s self-petitioning
regulations.70 In fact, Congress appears to have intended to enable all
battered immigrant women to have access to VAWA immigration
remedies.71 Thus, by only providing LEP-inaccessible processes and
procedures that effectively prevent May from accessing VAWA selfpetitioning remedies,72 USCIS contravenes clear congressional intent to
provide help to all immigrant victims of domestic violence.73 The
following sections describe how discrimination against LEP individuals is
covered under Title VI, which in USCIS’s case applies through Executive
Order 13,166.
1.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into
law.74 The Act codified constitutional anti-discrimination mandates and
provided for federal action to promote equality and eliminate racial
discrimination.75 It included provisions to end discrimination in public
66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (providing for unlimited family-based
immigration sponsorship for spouses of USCs); cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (2000) (describing
numerically-restricted preference-based allocation of family visas for spouses of LPRs).
67. See CONDITIONS, supra note 23 (specifying that the couple must file Form
I751 during the ninety days before the wife’s second anniversary as a conditional resident to
avoid USCIS initiating removal proceedings).
68. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 259 (calculating that in 72.3% of cases, abusive partners
do not file immigration papers for their foreign-born spouses).
69. Cf. id. at 275 (stating that 30.6% of battered women reported that they did not seek
services because they feared immigration problems).
70. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503(b)(1) (allowing for self-petitioning for victims
of domestic violence who married in good faith); 146 CONG. REC. S10,192 (daily ed. Oct.
11, 2000) (explaining that VAWA II attempts to amend immigration laws that allow USC or
LPR husbands to exploit the immigration system to abuse their immigrant wives further).
71. See, e.g., VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503(b)-(c) (covering women eligible for visas
based on family relationship); id. § 1504 (covering women in deportation proceedings); id. §
1505 (providing waivers for women with character or criminal impediments to
immigration); id. § 1513 (covering women victimized by violence, but who do not have a
marital relationship to the abuser).
72. See supra Part I.B (describing how providing information and application materials
only in English effectively excludes LEP women from accessing VAWA remedies).
73. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984) (stating that, using standard statutory construction, clear congressional intent is the
law).
74. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (outlining federal authority to enforce remedial
measures that would decrease discrimination).
75. See President John F. Kennedy, Address to Congress (Feb. 28, 1963) (noting that
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accommodations (Title II),76 to enforce school desegregation (Title IV),77 to
prohibit discrimination in federal programs (Title VI),78 and to promote
equal employment opportunity (Title VII).79 The basic aim of the Act was
to provide a statutory solution that prevented federally-assisted programs
from using taxpayer money to finance discrimination.80
Under Title VI, Section 601, organizations receiving federal funding
have an obligation to ensure that: “[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”81
Thus, Section 601 prohibits intentional discrimination, whereby a
federally-funded program treats a person differently based on their
membership in a protected group.82
Title VI, Section 602, authorizes and directs federal agencies that extend
funding to promulgate implementing regulations.83 The purpose of the
regulations is to implement the provisions of Title VI, Section 601, and
thereby outline when differential treatment may warrant agency
intercession.84
For example, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
implementing regulations state that a funded program “may not . . . on the
ground of race, color, or national origin: Provide any disposition, service,
financial aid, or benefit to an individual which is different, or is provided in
a different manner, from that provided to others under the program.”85
prior legislative and constitutional attempts had not ended racial discrimination), available
at http://www.congresslink.org/civil/cr1.html.
76. See 78 Stat. at 243 (enforcing non-discrimination in commercial establishments).
77. See 78 Stat. at 246 (allowing suits against state actors for discriminatory operation
of public schools).
78. See 78 Stat. at 252 (barring discrimination in any program receiving federal funds).
79. See 78 Stat. at 253 (providing for equal treatment in hiring, discharge, and
compensation decisions).
80. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 14 (Jan.
11, 2001) (summarizing statements by President Kennedy and Senator Humphrey during the
legislative
debates
on
the
Civil
Rights
Act),
available
at
http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf.
81. See Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. at 252 (countering lingering segregation and
discrimination supported by federal funding).
82. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 n.11 (11th Cir.
1993) (equating the analysis of intentional discrimination under Title VI to an equal
protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment). To prove a violation under Section
601, a plaintiff must provide evidence to show that “a challenged action was motivated by
an intent to discriminate.” See id. at 1406 (detailing factors such as substantial disparate
impact, agency history, and procedural irregularities as indicative of intent to discriminate).
83. See Title VI, § 602, 78 Stat. at 252 (providing a means by which agencies could
effectuate the non-discriminatory intent of Title VI).
84. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (noting that Title VI delegates
authority to agencies in order to determine kinds of disparate impact that require
modification of federal policies that produce the disparate impact).
85. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs—Implementation of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2004) (outlining prohibited
discrimination in the Title VI implementing regulations for federally-assisted programs). In
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Therefore, the Act prohibits federally-funded programs not only from
intentionally discriminating, but also from conducting facially-neutral
activities that have a disparate impact (i.e., a discriminatory effect) on
protected groups.86
2.

Executive Order 13,166
In 2000, President Clinton reiterated the scope of Title VI protection in
Executive Order 13,166, which requires programs to provide improved
access to “persons who, as a result of national origin, are limited in their
English proficiency.”87 Title VI originally excluded from coverage
federally-conducted programs such as USCIS that were financed and
operated entirely by the federal government.88 However, Executive Order
13,166 extended the obligations of Title VI to include federal agencies’
own activities and required each agency to prepare and implement a plan to
improve access by LEP individuals to its services.89 It also required
agencies to draft Title VI guidance for their funded programs to ensure
meaningful access for LEP individuals.90 Thus, under Executive Order
13,166, both federally-funded programs and federally-conducted agencies
have an obligation to eliminate LEP barriers to full and meaningful
participation in their activities.91
November 2002, Congress transferred immigration responsibilities, including VAWA
remedies, to the new Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). See Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, Title IV, Subtitle F, § 471 (2002)
(codified as amended in 6 U.S.C. § 291) (abolishing the INS under DOJ, and creating
USCIS under DHS). Soon after, DHS confirmed that it shared its predecessor’s
commitment to complying with Title VI. See 6 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(1)(ii) (2004) (mirroring
DOJ regulatory language for DHS’s own Title VI implementing regulations).
86. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293-94 (noting that Section 602 of Title VI reaches
disparate impact whereas Section 601 only reaches intentional discrimination). A threeprong test exists to evaluate claims of disparate impact discrimination: (1) whether an
agency’s action, while facially neutral, has a disproportionate discriminatory impact on a
protected group; (2) whether the agency can show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the action; and (3) whether the stated reason is pretextual, or if there is a “comparably
effective alternative practice” which is not discriminatory. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407
(borrowing the disparate impact test from Title VII disparate impact cases).
87. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federally-conducted
and federally-assisted programs to improve access for LEP individuals).
88. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, at 15-16 (defining “federal action that is
not federal financial assistance”).
89. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, § 2 (requiring development and implementation of
LEP plans within 120 days of the Executive Order). But see S. 557, 109th Cong. (2005)
(opposing Executive Order 13,166, and attempting to nullify its effect and prohibit the
appropriation of funds for non-English services).
90. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, § 3 (noting that the Title VI guidance should be
consistent with DOJ Guidance).
91. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., EXECUTIVE ORDER 13166 LIMITED
ENGLISH PROFICIENCY RESOURCE DOCUMENT: TIPS AND TOOLS FROM THE FIELD,
Introduction (Sept. 21, 2004), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/lep/tips_and_tools-9-2104.htm (on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that Executive Order
13,166 required: (1) federal agencies to take steps to provide meaningful access to LEP
people to federally-conducted programs; and (2) federal agencies that provide financial
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On the same date that the President issued the Executive Order, the DOJ
issued a Policy Guidance document to help agencies draft Title VI
guidelines for programs.92 The DOJ guidance notes that failure to provide
meaningful access to services for LEP applicants may be discrimination on
the basis of national origin,93 and the DOJ does not distinguish between
federally-funded and federally-conducted agencies in this context:
[W]ith the issuance of Executive Order 13166, for the first time, all 95+
federal departments and agencies are also required to develop and
implement appropriate language assistance plans (LAPs) governing their
own “federally conducted” programs and activities. These internal
federal agency LAPs must be consistent with the standards applicable to
recipients of federal financial assistance.94

The DOJ then laid out a four-factor balancing test with which federallyconducted and funded agencies could verify that they were taking
reasonable steps toward assuring LEP individuals meaningful access to
their information and services.95 The agency should consider the following
factors: (1) the number or proportion of LEP persons who receive services;
(2) the frequency with which the agency comes into contact with LEP
persons; (3) the importance of the agency’s service; and (4) the agency’s
resources.96 The DOJ later revised and reissued the Policy Guidance97 and
issued the final guidance document in 2002.98 The basic four-factor test
remained constant in the various versions.99
assistance to other programs to publish guidelines on how to provide meaningful access to
programs and comply with Title VI).
92. See Enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—National Origin
Discrimination Against Persons With Limited English Proficiency, Policy Guidance, 65
Fed. Reg. 50,123 (Dep’t of Justice Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Enforcement of Title VI]
(providing a four-step test and examples to ensure its funded programs were in compliance
with Title VI obligations to LEP individuals).
93. See id. at 50,124 (describing requirements for recipients of federal funding under
Title VI).
94. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal
language assistance plans be consistent with standards applicable to recipients of federal
funding).
95. See Enforcement of Title VI, supra note 92, at 50,124 (providing guidance to
federal agencies on how to measure compliance with Executive Order 13,166 and Title VI).
96. See id. at 50,124-25 (noting that the DOJ designed the test to be flexible and
variable with agency-specific facts).
97. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI
Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient
Persons, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,834 (Dep’t of Justice Jan. 16, 2001) (adding quality control and
agency-specific guidelines to the initial guidance).
98. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI
Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient
Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,455 (Dep’t of Justice June 18, 2002) [hereinafter Guidance to
Federal Financial Assistance Recipients] (clarifying, after a notice and comment period, the
policy on the use of family members as informal interpreters and the minimum requirements
to establish de facto compliance with translation obligations).
99. Compare Enforcement of Title VI, supra note 92, at 50,124-25 (requiring
assessment of the number of LEP individuals, frequency of contact, importance of the
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The DOJ test serves as a guide to compliance, and courts should grant
substantial deference to the guidelines when determining what constitutes a
Title VI/Executive Order violation.100 While per se compliance with the
four-factor test may provide evidence of facially meaningful access to
activities, it does not absolve programs of their responsibility to ensure that
each individual LEP applicant has meaningful access to benefits.101
Therefore, if May challenged a federally-funded agency’s language
accommodations, a court would likely consider the agency’s obligations to
the general LEP population within the framework of the DOJ policy
guidance,102 but would do so with reference to specific Title VI obligations
to May under Section 601.103 Therefore, May can challenge a domestic
violence shelter that receives federal funding for failing to provide
translated VAWA information,104 but ironically, has little recourse against
USCIS. May can probably bring an administrative claim, but the process is
notoriously slow and ineffectual.105 May cannot ask the court to enforce
USCIS’s obligations to provide her with meaningful access because Title
VI, Section 601 only covers federally-funded agencies, not federal agencies
program, and available resources), with Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,459-61 (mirroring the basic test from Enforcement of Title
VI).
100. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that
“administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority”); Neal v. Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 770
(9th Cir. 1999) (deferring to the interpretation of Title IX provided in the guidelines of a
compliance test developed by the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 226 (2003). But see Mona T. Peterson, Note, The Unauthorized
Protection of Language Under Title VI, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1437, 1473-74 (2001) (arguing
that the Department of Health and Human Services exceeded its Title VI authority by
issuing policy guidelines designed to remedy discrimination against LEP individuals).
101. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (mandating that “[n]o person” shall be discriminated
against on the basis of national origin and providing collective and individual protection).
102. See, e.g., Neal, 198 F.3d at 770 (deferring to agency guidelines for interpretation of
statutory obligations).
103. See, e.g., Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(finding that plaintiffs stated a claim for intentional discrimination in violation of Section
601 based on a facially discriminatory policy).
104. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,472
(providing detailed suggestions for domestic violence shelters on accommodations to ensure
shelters are not discriminating against LEP women in violation of Title VI).
105. See, e.g., Alma Lowry, Achieving Justice: The Case for Legislative Reform, 20
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 335, 348-49 (2003) (critiquing the agency administrative complaint
procedure in the environmental protection context for being slow, weak in terms of
resolution, and lacking any process by which to stay the challenged action). LEP
individuals should be able to access administrative solutions via the DOJ’s Civil Rights
Division, which now bears the primary responsibility for ensuring agency policies do not
result in a disparate impact on protected groups. See Guidance to Federal Financial
Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,466 (detailing the DOJ Title VI voluntary
compliance complaint procedure).
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themselves,106 and Executive Order 13,166 is not enforceable in court.107
Thus, USCIS can, seemingly without the risk of judicial review, ignore the
requirement to provide meaningful LEP access mandated by the Executive
Order (its “implied Title VI” obligations).108 USCIS may not ignore the
obligations imposed by the Constitution, however, and the next sections
explore whether USCIS is vulnerable to judicial review for violating May’s
constitutional rights.
II. USCIS’S ADMINISTRATION OF VAWA AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The Constitution distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens.109
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that where the Constitution does
not specifically limit coverage to citizens, it protects all those living in the
United States, without regard to race or nationality.110 May has lived with
John in the United States for several years.111 As a result of her presence in
and affiliation with the community, she has gained an entitlement to
constitutional protection.112 Thus, May has a right to live free from
arbitrary deprivations of her life, liberty, or property,113 in the same way as
any U.S. citizen would.114 The next sections describe how USCIS’s
106. See Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. at 252 (prohibiting discrimination “under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”).
107. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (specifying that the Order “does
not create any right . . . enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its
agencies, its officers or employees, or any person”). See generally Steven Ostrow, Note,
Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 661 (1987) (discussing the difficulty of
challenging agency action pursuant to an Executive Order because courts rarely recognize a
valid Administration Procedure Act cause of action).
108. But see infra Parts II-III (arguing that USCIS is vulnerable to judicial review for
both due process and equal protection violations).
109. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV (protecting the right to vote for “citizens of the
United States”), with id. amend. XIV (extending equal protection and due process of the law
to “all persons”).
110. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (extending due
process protections to all persons in the United States); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886) (extending equal protection to all persons “within the territorial jurisdiction” of
the United States).
111. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 8, at 263 tbl.2 (reporting that the battered immigrant
Latinas who took part in the study had been in the U.S. for an average of 5.5 years).
112. Compare United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(determining that past precedent establishes that constitutional protections apply to those
who have “come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with this country”), and Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce
an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with
permanent residence, [her] constitutional status changes accordingly.”), with Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (refusing to recognize a liberty
interest in initial entry into the United States and upholding Congress’s authority to
determine acceptable procedures for denial of entry).
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting deprivation of “life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law”).
114. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (noting that the Due Process
Clause applies to those present in the United States, “whether their presence here is lawful,
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administration of VAWA remedies violates May’s rights by depriving her
of an interest protected by due process.
A. Background: Due Process Rights
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”115 Conversely,
the government is free to deny privileges without any procedure where
there is no recognized life, liberty, or property interest.116 The Supreme
Court has not defined the parameters of liberty, simply noting that it
encompasses more than freedom from bodily restraint and includes “those
privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness.”117 Property interests include real and personal property, as well
as statutory entitlements such as welfare and government employment.118
Due process applies where the government intentionally infringes on a
person’s protected interests119 and to prevent arbitrary government action,
the government must provide fair procedures where protected interests are
at stake.120 However, the timing and contents of the procedures required
depend upon the specific factual scenario.121 Thus, May’s entitlement to
notice of VAWA remedies in a language she can understand depends on
whether USCIS’s administration of VAWA deprives her of a recognized
life, liberty, or property interest without due process of law.

unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1976)
(clarifying that irrespective of immigration status, all persons “within the jurisdiction of the
United States” receive due process protection against arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty,
or property); cf. Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United
States: The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 303, 333-34 (2001) (arguing that all would-be asylum applicants in the U.S. are
entitled to fair due process procedures because U.S. statutory grants and commitments to
international norms have created a liberty and property interest in seeking asylum).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
116. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.2, at 581 (2d ed. 1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court
has enabled agencies to define interests in such a way as to eliminate the requirements of
due process by narrowly defining “life, liberty, or property”).
117. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (noting that
the concept of liberty extends beyond criminal imprisonment, and includes the right to
contract, to marry, and to acquire knowledge).
118. See, e.g., id. at 578 (determining due process rights of a non-tenured government
employee to continued employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970)
(requiring a hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits).
119. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986) (requiring more than an
unintended loss or injury caused by government negligence to constitute a deprivation
subject to due process).
120. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70 (noting that an individual has the right to a prior
hearing when liberty and property interests are at stake).
121. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (noting that due process is
variable with time, place, and circumstance and requires a balancing of private and
government interests).
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1.

Due process case law
The Supreme Court has struggled to define which interests due process
protects and to determine how to balance competing interests so that due
process procedures are fair.122 In Goldberg v. Kelley,123 the Supreme Court
evaluated the elements of due process required before an agency could
revoke welfare benefits.124 After determining that the right to continued
welfare benefits was a statutory entitlement,125 the Court noted that the
agency should consider the individual circumstances of a recipient when
considering appropriate means to ensure due process.126 In Goldberg,
because termination of welfare “may deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means by which to live,” the recipient was entitled to a heightened
degree of procedural due process.127
In Mathews v. Eldridge,128 the Supreme Court developed a flexible
approach to evaluating due process procedural protection with a threeprong test.129 The test balances the private interest, the risk of erroneous
deprivation, and the value of the safeguards, and the government’s interest
in avoiding additional burden.130 In Mathews, the Court distinguished the
private interest, namely continued receipt of disability benefits, from that in
Goldberg by determining that disability recipients were not “on the very
margin of subsistence” and therefore there was a lower degree of potential
deprivation.131 There was a lesser chance of error than in Goldberg
because the evidence was factual, not discretionary, and came from
medical experts, not from the beneficiaries themselves.132 Finally, the
Court noted the high potential cost of providing pre-termination hearings to
all disability claimants133 and concluded that such hearings were not
122. See infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s rulings in
two seminal cases, Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge, that attempt to define the
parameters of procedural due process).
123. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
124. See id. at 260 (defining the issue as whether the Due Process Clause requires the
agency to provide an evidentiary hearing to a welfare recipient prior to termination of
benefits).
125. See id. at 265 (concluding that public assistance promotes the general welfare and
prosperity of society).
126. See id. at 268-69 (pointing out, for example, that requiring written submissions of
recipients with little education is unreasonable).
127. See id. at 264 (holding that discontinuation of welfare requires a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing) (emphasis added).
128. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
129. See id. at 334-35 (noting that due process is flexible to a particular situation).
130. See id. at 335 (requiring a balancing of governmental and private interests in order
to ascertain whether administrative procedures meet due process requirements).
131. See id. at 340-42 (noting that a disabled person likely has access to other financial
resources or forms of government assistance in addition to disability payments).
132. See id. at 344 (noting that procedural due process requirements vary with the risk of
error in fact finding).
133. See id. at 347 (surmising that claimants would request a hearing in large numbers
prior to termination of benefits).
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required in order for the administrative procedures to comport with due
process.134 Thus, the Court established a context-dependent test for due
process that provides for notice and hearing procedural requirements that
vary with the importance of the interest involved.135 A court evaluating
May’s due process claim would therefore analyze USCIS’s provisions
within the specific context of an LEP battered immigrant woman
attempting to assert a VAWA claim.
2.

Language access case law
Legal advocacy for language access began in the criminal context almost
a century ago and led to the establishment of a due process right to
interpretation for LEP criminal defendants.136 Immigrants in deportation
hearings have a similar Fifth Amendment due process right to language
assistance.137 Notably, the Ninth Circuit, in Walters v. Reno,138 the only
appellate court case to discuss an immigrant’s right to written translations,
used a balancing test similar in scope to the DOJ test as part of its due
process analysis.139 The court applied the three-prong test from Mathews140
and concluded that the INS’s policy of sending English-only forms to
immigrants facing deportation failed to provide constitutionally adequate
notice of the severe consequences.141 The court weighed the plaintiffs’
134. See id. at 349 (noting that present administrative procedures that provided for notice
and an opportunity to respond, but no hearing, prior to termination were consistent with due
process).
135. See id. at 334 (observing that past cases have shown that due process is flexible and
varies with time, place, and circumstance).
136. See, e.g., Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907) (noting in dicta that the
appointment of an interpreter is at the discretion of the trial court); Negrón v. New York,
434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating that a defendant has a due process right to an
interpreter if needed to assist with her own defense, receive assistance of counsel, or
confront witnesses); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2000) (requiring interpreters for LEP parties
in district court cases where the government is a party). Unfortunately, the right to an
interpreter in court addresses only part of the problem of legal access. See Daniel J.
Rearick, Note, Reaching Out to the Most Insular Minorities: A Proposal for Improving
Latino Access to the American Legal System, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 543, 551-59
(2004) (describing language barriers to consulting with counsel and accessing the appellate
process).
137. See, e.g., El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office for Immigration Review,
959 F.2d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing due process rights to sufficient translation to
ensure a “full and fair hearing” during deportation proceedings); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d
32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring interpretation that allows “the applicant to place his claim
before the judge” in deportation hearings).
138. 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998).
139. Compare id. at 1043 (evaluating immigrants’ due process rights to notice of
deportation by balancing the importance of the service to the individual with the
government burden), with Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note
98, at 41,459-61 (providing a four-part test that balances the need for language
accommodations with availability of agency resources).
140. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (evaluating due process
compliance by balancing the private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value
of the safeguards, and the government’s interest in avoiding additional burden).
141. See Walters, 145 F.3d at 1041 (noting that even individuals with a reasonable
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interest in not being able to stay in the United States against the
government’s interest in properly administering immigration laws and
determined that INS could improve the way it notified immigrants without
undue burden.142 The court declined to require the INS to translate forms,
however, even though it said the INS could provide notice effectively by
using multilingual forms.143 Thus, the court established that LEP
individuals have due process rights to language assistance in some
immigration contexts, but still permitted USCIS to define the parameters
under which it provides such assistance.144
B. LEP Battered Immigrant Women’s Entitlement to VAWA Remedies
Due process attaches to statutorily-created entitlements and requires the
government to follow sufficient procedural safeguards before eliminating
the interest created.145 With its enactment of VAWA, Congress recognized
a liberty interest whereby women have a right to live free from violence.146
In addition, Congress recognized the specific barriers faced by immigrant
women, such as the fact that May’s ability to leave John and live free from
violence depends largely on her accessing VAWA relief.147
May’s entitlement to VAWA remedies is arguably also a property
right.148 May’s property interest in the continued processing of her
immigration petition is analogous to a person’s right to continued state
benefits.149 It is possible that USCIS would treat May as an applicant for a
benefit, lessening her property entitlement,150 but Congress recognized that
command of English would not obtain notice from the legalistic, cumbersome, and
misleading deportation procedure documents).
142. See id. at 1043-44 (noting that INS need make only minor adaptations in the content
and presentation method of the forms to comply with due process requirements).
143. See id. at 1053 (deferring to the INS the determination of the ways in which it could
revise the forms to communicate information more clearly).
144. See id. (reminding INS that it should be consistent in furnishing information to LEP
applicants).
145. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (noting that the state could only
terminate a statutory entitlement to welfare benefits after completing procedures that
afforded the beneficiary due process).
146. See VAWA I, supra note 1, §§ 40,001-40,703 (providing women protection against
domestic violence in the form of enhanced arrest and sentencing for violent partners,
funding for shelters and hotlines, and education and awareness programs); see also VAWA
II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(2) (stating that the purpose of the Act is to provide protection
against domestic violence to immigrant domestic violence victims).
147. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(1) (noting that the purpose of VAWA is to
remove immigration laws that keep battered immigrant women locked in abusive
relationships).
148. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (requiring a
“legitimate claim of entitlement” to a benefit in order for it to be a property interest).
149. Compare VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(2) (providing “protection against
deportation” for eligible battered immigrant women), with Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63
(discussing a range of entitlements, such as welfare benefits and public employment, that
may be regarded as property rights).
150. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 116, § 17.5, at 75 (arguing that Supreme Court
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May’s entitlement to spousal immigration benefits did not diminish simply
because she married an abusive USC or LPR.151
If May stays with John for another year, the deadline for him to apply to
remove the conditions on her residence will arrive.152 John will not likely
file the necessary paperwork,153 and USCIS will start proceedings to deport
May.154 If John does not intercept the deportation notice, and if May can
understand the English in which it is written, she might seek immigration
assistance.155 If she discloses the abuse to the lawyer, she might learn
about and apply for VAWA cancellation of removal options.156 Once in
deportation proceedings, ironically, USCIS must provide May with
adequate language assistance to access VAWA benefits.157
Deportation proceedings protect an important liberty interest, which
justifies the heightened procedures that are necessary to guarantee due
process.158 However, May and other LEP battered immigrant women have
a statutory entitlement to immigration remedies that enable them to live
free from violence before they are placed in deportation.159 Once Congress
has conferred a property or liberty interest, it may not eliminate it without
rulings provide that property entitlements attach, and due process procedures are required,
only after the government has granted the beneficiary the benefit). The DOJ has also
specifically noted that its suggestions on LEP compliance reach applicants for benefits. See
FED. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY, KNOW YOUR
RIGHTS (suggesting that a Food Stamp office that only provides application materials in
English and requires applicants to provide their own interpreters may be discriminating in
violation of Title VI), available at http://www.lep.gov/LEP_beneficiary_brochure.pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2005). See generally Virginia Vance, Note, Applications for Benefits, Due
Process, Equal Protection, and the Right to Be Free From Arbitrary Procedures, 61 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 883 (2004) (addressing the issue of whether an applicant for benefits is
covered by due process or other safeguards against arbitrary denial).
151. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503(a) (defining the category of persons covered by
VAWA II to include spouses as defined elsewhere in the I.N.A. for the purposes of family
immigration).
152. See CONDITIONS, supra note 23 (warning that the couple must file Form I-751
jointly during the ninety days before the second anniversary of becoming a conditional
resident).
153. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 259 (calculating that in 72.3% of cases, abusive USC or
LPR spouses do not file immigration papers for their spouses).
154. See CONDITIONS, supra note 23 (stating that USCIS initiates removal proceedings if
the petitioner does not file I-751 in a timely manner).
155. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 273 tbl.10 (finding that 36.6% of Latinas who had been
physically and sexually abused accessed immigration services).
156. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1504 (specifying requirements for cancellation of
removal as (i) battery or extreme cruelty, (ii) physical presence in the United States for at
least three years, (iii) good moral character, and (iv) extreme hardship upon deportation).
157. See El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 959
F.2d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing due process rights to interpretation to ensure a
“full and fair hearing” during deportation proceedings).
158. See Hirsch v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir.
1962) (finding that due process requires prescribed procedures in a deportation hearing
because of the severity of the remedy of deportation).
159. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503 (providing for self-petitioning remedies for
battered immigrant women).
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appropriate due process safeguards.160 However, in the absence of
information in a language she can understand, there is a strong probability
that May will not find out about available self-petitioning relief or will not
apply for immigration benefits.161 Thus, USCIS’s administration of
VAWA remedies effectively deprives May of an entitlement that Congress
intended her to have.162
C. USCIS’s Administration of VAWA Violates LEP Battered Immigrant
Women’s Due Process Rights
USCIS’s administrative procedures are constitutionally insufficient to
assure May’s due process right to VAWA remedies.163 The Supreme Court
has noted that once the government has established an entitlement,
“[p]arties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in
order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.”164 Using
the three-part Mathews test, courts have distinguished due process rights
inherent in proceedings where the government seeks to deprive an
individual of liberty from those where an individual seeks an immigration
status enhancement.165 The following section applies the Mathews test to
the specifics of May’s situation and determines the extent to which due
process requires language accommodation for LEP battered immigrant
women eligible for VAWA remedies.
1.

Application of the Mathews three-prong test
The first Mathews factor addresses private interests.166 In Mathews, the
Supreme Court evaluated the private interest of a plaintiff in protecting his
disability benefits from erroneous termination and determined that the
interest was low because the recipient had alternative sources of income

160. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (holding that
Congress may choose not to create a property interest, but once it has done so, it may not
deprive the interest holder of that benefit without procedural safeguards).
161. See infra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing that on an annual basis an
estimated 50,000 immigrant spouses are eligible for VAWA benefits); infra note 225 and
accompanying text (noting that approximately 6,000 individuals apply for VAWA
annually).
162. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b) (aiming to remove barriers to immigration
remedies for battered immigrant women).
163. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing a three-part test to
evaluate due process claims that balances private interest against government burden).
164. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (discussing the long-standing meaning of procedural due process).
165. Compare Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding strong
due process rights for immigrants facing deportation), with Abdullah v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 184 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 1999) (not finding a due process right to
interpretation for applicants for temporary Seasonal Agricultural Worker status).
166. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (detailing the three-part test used to evaluate
procedural due process requirements).
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available.167 In contrast, May is more like the welfare beneficiary in
Goldberg168 and she has a strong interest in accessing VAWA benefits
because she has no viable alternatives to the immigration assistance
offered.169
Congress intended VAWA to grant to immigrant women battered by
USC or LPR husbands a statutory right to remain in the United States free
from violence.170 Due process requirements rise with the danger of
deprivation of liberty.171 Without VAWA relief, there is a likelihood that
May will stay in the abusive relationship.172 Congress recognized that
May’s situation is dire whether she stays in an abusive relationship or is
placed in deportation proceedings and provided an avenue by which May
can avoid loss of immigration status, deportation, injury, or even death.173
The second prong of the Mathews test addresses the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the value of the procedural safeguards.174 USCIS does not
have “carefully structured procedures” that provide sufficient safeguards
against mistaken deprivation as required in Mathews.175 In fact, USCIS’s
procedures are completely inappropriate for the specifics of May’s

167. See id. at 342-43 (noting that the plaintiff had access to private resources and other
government aid).
168. See 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that the welfare recipient was entitled to a
heightened degree of procedural due process because the termination of welfare benefits
“may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live”); see also supra notes
123-27 and accompanying text (discussing Goldberg).
169. See, e.g., Timothy Pratt, Immigrants in Abusive Homes Often Live in Fear, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Aug. 18, 2003, at 01 (reporting that a battered immigrant woman only left her
abusive husband after she learned of VAWA remedies that would allow her to stay in the
U.S. with her three children). This is not to say that May will passively endure the violence
if she does not gain access to VAWA; battered immigrant women employ a range of
survival strategies from talking with other women, obtaining a protective order, or calling
the police. See, e.g., VOLPP, supra note 14, at 21-34 (discussing how advocates can help
battered immigrant women with civil, criminal, and safety options).
170. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(3) (explaining that one purpose of VAWA is
to remove barriers that prevent USCIS from offering immigration assistance to battered
immigrant women).
171. See Abdullah v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 184 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir.
1999) (finding deportation to be a more important due process right than refusal of a work
visa).
172. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 284 tbl.17 (noting that 11.5% of battered immigrant
Latinas with an abusive USC or LPR spouse did not access services because they feared
immigration consequences); Harris, supra note 14, at 12-13 (describing five typical
responses of a battered immigrant woman to domestic violence, such as leaving the house,
calling a friend, or defending herself, but noting that women rarely sought police or state
assistance because of fear of immigration consequences).
173. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,195 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (introducing VAWA II to
Congress and noting that its aim was to prevent abusers from using immigration law to
prevent a battered immigrant woman from reporting the abuse or leaving the relationship).
174. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing a three-part test to
evaluate due process).
175. See id. at 346 (finding the administrative procedures to be fair and reliable and in
line with due process requirements).
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situation.176 May’s lack of English proficiency affects her understanding of
the VAWA application process and increases the risk of USCIS
erroneously denying her eligibility because she may misunderstand the
questions asked, miss important deadlines for filing, or incorrectly fill out
the form.177
In addition, if May makes a mistake on her VAWA application, USCIS
may delay her eligibility for welfare benefits and work authorization,
placing her in a precarious economic situation and increasing the impact on
her liberty interest to live free from violence.178 If USCIS provided
translated VAWA materials at the information and application stage, May
could understand and comply with the procedural requirements.179 Thus,
the additional procedures May seeks are well-targeted to reducing the risk
of erroneous deprivation.180
The third Mathews factor addresses the government’s interest in
avoiding additional burden.181 In Mathews, the Supreme Court found that
there was a significant public interest in not providing evidentiary hearings
for all benefit-termination cases because of the substantial on-going cost.182
In contrast, USCIS could provide cost-effective access by translating Form
I-360 once and having copies available for multiple applicants until it next
revises the form.183 Obviously, the cost impact rises with the number of
176. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (arguing that written evidentiary
requirements violated due process requirements for welfare recipients, most of whom lacked
the education necessary to complete the paperwork).
177. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an Asian LEP battered
immigrant woman failed to get relief because of procedural problems with the court
paperwork).
178. See Immigration Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(6)(ii) (2004) (noting that USCIS can
make a prima facie petition determination only if the applicant has fulfilled I-360
requirements and provided evidence to support her claim).
179. Cf. Erin Adamson, Spanish-Language Legal Forms to Help Workers, Immigrants,
TOPEKA CAPITAL J., Oct. 8, 2003, at A10 (explaining that the Kansas court system planned
to translate its domestic violence protection forms to enable battered immigrant women to
comprehend the process and access the system).
180. Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (deciding that an oral
hearing was not required where benefit decisions were largely made on the basis of standard
medical reports), with Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269 (requiring an oral hearing for welfare
recipients who “lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who
cannot obtain professional assistance”).
181. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (balancing the fiscal and administrative burdens
assumed by the government).
182. See id. at 347-48 (noting that benefits of providing the hearings must be weighed
against the public interest in avoiding the cost).
183. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ASSESSMENT OF THE TOTAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13166: IMPROVING ACCESS TO SERVICES FOR
PERSONS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY 36 (Mar. 14, 2002) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT]
(noting translation cost for I-360 as about $200 per language), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/lepfinal3-14.pdf.
In 2002, the Office of
Management and Budget estimated that INS could translate all 123 of its forms into five
languages for less than $150,000. See id. at 40 (emphasizing that this would be a one-time,
not an annual cost).
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languages required, and it is likely VAWA applicants speak and read
multiple languages.184 However, a theoretical cost impact lacks credence,
especially when USCIS cannot prove it because of its own failure to
compile statistics on the languages spoken by those who seek its
services.185
In addition, the DOJ Guidance provides for varying levels of language
accommodation depending on the number of LEP persons who speak a
particular language.186 Even if there is a significant cost impact for
translating information and evidence, cost factors alone cannot override
overwhelming due process considerations under the other two prongs.187
Finally, the equal availability of VAWA remedies benefits society at large
because May will be free to pursue criminal remedies against her abuser as
originally envisioned by Congress, thus preventing further damage to
society caused by domestic violence.188 Thus, each prong of the Mathews
test weighs heavily in favor of May, indicating that she has a due process
right to LEP-compliant procedures by which she may access VAWA
remedies.
2.

Constitutionally adequate notice
By limiting May’s access to VAWA, USCIS’s lack of LEP-compliant
procedures deprives May of her liberty interest in VAWA relief in violation
of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.189 May cannot assert a claim

184. See id. at 35-36 (indicating that about twenty-five percent of all USCIS customers
speak Spanish and an additional two percent each speak Hindi, Chinese, Tagalog, and
Arabic); SHIN & BRUNO, supra note 36, at 2 fig.3 (reporting that according to the 2000
Census, 28.1 million U.S. residents speak Spanish, two million speak Chinese, 1.6 million
speak French, one million speak Vietnamese, 0.7 million speak Russian, and 0.6 million
speak Arabic).
185. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 43 (commenting that INS does not maintain
documentation on the language requirements of the people it serves).
186. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,460
(allowing for a flexible combination of oral and written language accommodations
depending upon a four-factor analysis of the number of LEP persons and the importance of
the service).
187. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (placing the burden on the agency
to find ways to accommodate increased costs associated with constitutionally-required
procedures); Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,460
(noting that large entities clearly must substantiate any argument that lack of resources
limits their provision of LEP language access); Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The
New Asylum Rule: Improved But Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 57 (2001) (noting
USCIS’s obligation to provide interpretation services to asylum seekers where the cost is a
fraction of its budget).
188. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(1) (removing barriers to criminal
prosecution of abusers of immigrant women as part of a comprehensive federal domestic
violence prevention program).
189. Cf. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1998) (determining that INS
forms were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to inform LEP immigrants of
their options).
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if she has no notice of its availability as a remedy.190 Even though May is
not (yet) in deportation proceedings, her liberty interest in gaining relief
from violence heightens the due process requirements of her situation and
places it on a par with the rights of the plaintiffs in Walters.191 In Walters,
the Ninth Circuit held that, without inordinate hardship, the INS could
simplify the content and presentation of its forms and provide
constitutionally adequate notice to LEP immigrants facing deportation.192
USCIS similarly has a Fifth Amendment obligation to provide
constitutionally adequate notice, including notice through Form
I-360,
which adequately informs May of her rights and the consequences to her of
not filing the form.193 Protection of May’s due process rights requires that
USCIS provide LEP applicants with language assistance so that they may
participate effectively in the VAWA process.194 An English-only process
fails to provide a constitutionally-adequate procedure,195 and in order not to
deprive May and other LEP battered immigrant women of access to
remedies, USCIS should provide translations of information and evidence
as needed.196 Additionally, provision of LEP-compliant services enables
USCIS to interpret and administer VAWA remedies equitably and in line
with congressional intent.197 In light of the foregoing analysis that May has
a due process right to access VAWA remedies, the lack of judicial review
of USCIS’s failure to comply with Executive Order 13,166 and its implied
Title VI obligations seems particularly troublesome. The following section
examines whether May has any means by which to gain USCIS’s
compliance.
III. ENFORCING USCIS’S OBLIGATIONS TO LEP BATTERED IMMIGRANT
WOMEN
Executive Order 13,166 extended implied Title VI national origin
190. See supra Part I.B (detailing the ways in which failure to provide LEP-compliant
Websites, information, application forms, and the requirement of English-language evidence
hinders May’s access to VAWA remedies).
191. Cf. Walters, 145 F.3d at 1043-44 (balancing the plaintiffs’ significant interest in
avoiding deportation with the government’s interest in administering immigration laws).
192. See id. at 1044 (noting that the benefits of the procedural safeguards against
deportation outweighed the burden of making the changes).
193. See id. at 1042 (determining that a complex English form advising LEP immigrants
of deportation procedures failed to inform them adequately so that they could waive their
rights knowingly).
194. Cf. Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring translation services
that allow an applicant to assert a claim effectively in deportation hearings).
195. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) (“The opportunity to be heard
must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”).
196. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,463
(warning that failure to translate vital documents “may effectively deny LEP individuals
meaningful access” to programs and services).
197. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(2) (offering protection against domestic
violence to battered immigrant women).
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discrimination obligations to federally-conducted agencies such as
USCIS.198 The Executive Order requires the agency to ensure “meaningful
access”199 to its programs for LEP applicants and recipients of benefits.200
The following discussion illustrates how USCIS’s provision of Englishonly VAWA materials, despite regulations and guidance encouraging LEPaccessibility, contravenes the intent of the Executive Order and its
associated implied Title VI obligations.
A. “Meaningful Access” for LEP Battered Immigrant Women
1.

Case law
The Supreme Court first correlated language and national origin
discrimination in a Title VI case in Lau v. Nichols.201 In Lau, a group of
Chinese-speaking students challenged their school district’s policy of
providing instruction in English only.202 The Supreme Court concluded
that the school district’s policies conflicted with the goals of Title VI, as
implemented in the district’s own regulations,203 because a significant
number of LEP students were unable to access the benefits of a federallyassisted program.204 The holding relied on Section 601 to reverse the court
of appeals decision205 and thus implicitly recognized a private right of
action against agencies whose actions had a disparate impact on protected
groups in violation of Title VI, Section 602 implementing regulations.206
Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lau, the Eleventh Circuit,
in Sandoval v. Hagan,207 found that a policy of the Department of Public
198. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federally-conducted
agencies to provide LEP individuals with equivalent access to that provided to English
speakers); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal
language assistance plans be consistent with standards applicable to recipients of federal
funding).
199. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. at 290. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 302 (1985) (finding that a fourteen day limit on Medicaid services was facially neutral
and did not deny “meaningful access” to benefits for qualified individuals who had a
handicap); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (finding that English-only education
denied Chinese-speaking students a “meaningful opportunity” to participate in the
educational program).
200. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. at 290.
201. 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
202. Id. at 564.
203. See id. at 567 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1)) (noting that the department’s Title
VI implementing regulations issued pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI prohibited schools
from providing differential services and restricting access to programs).
204. See id. at 564 (discussing how the school district denied 1,800 Chinese students
supplemental English instruction and thus barred their access to other curricula).
205. See id. at 566 (finding Section 601 of Title VI sufficient to reverse the lower court’s
ruling and therefore not reaching an Equal Protection Clause argument).
206. See id. at 568 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)) (discussing the bar on discrimination
in regulations passed under Section 602, “which has [discriminatory effect] even though no
purposeful design is present”).
207. 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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Safety to provide driver’s license examinations only in English had an
unlawful disparate impact on LEP individuals in violation of Title VI.208
The Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Sandoval,209 overturned the lower
court’s decision and held that the plaintiffs had no private right of action to
enforce a disparate impact claim.210 However, the Court did not address
the merits of the case and left intact a private right of action for intentional
discrimination claims.211 Thus, while there remains some debate about the
broader implications of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sandoval for Title
VI disparate impact claims,212 it appears that the correlation of language
and national origin articulated in Lau213 is still good law.214
2.

USCIS does not provide meaningful access to VAWA
The DOJ Guidelines state that federally-funded agencies must ensure
that LEP individuals like May have “meaningful access” to programs.215
The DOJ and DHS Title VI implementing regulations support this goal and
208. See id. at 508 (noting that 13,000 residents could not obtain licenses because of the
English requirement, that the majority of these LEP individuals were from a country of
origin other than the United States, and that the Department made accommodations for other
disadvantaged groups such as the deaf and disabled).
209. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
210. See id. at 293 (holding that Title VI does not create a private right of action to
enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Section 602).
211. See id. at 278 (noting that the only question presented was whether private
individuals may sue to enforce Section 602 disparate-impact regulations). Sandoval, in
effect, did for Title VI plaintiffs what the Supreme Court had done to equal protection
plaintiffs fifteen years earlier: required them to prove intentional discrimination in order to
state a claim. Compare id. at 293 (eliminating a private right of action to enforce disparateimpact regulations promulgated under Section 602, and leaving intentional discrimination
under Section 601 as the only cause of action), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976) (stating that disproportionate impact alone is insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny for
invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).
212. Compare ProEnglish v. Bush, No. 02-2044, 2003 WL 21101726, at *2, *4 (4th Cir.
May 15, 2003) (citing the district court’s interest in plaintiff’s claim that equation of
language and national origin is unconstitutional, but upholding prior dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction), with Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra
note 98, at 41,458 (stating that the DOJ rejects the argument that Sandoval strikes down
Title VI regulations). See generally Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and
Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774 (2003)
(discussing the explicit and implicit ramifications of Sandoval on individuals’ private right
of action).
213. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (including disparate impact based on
provision of English-only services to Chinese-speaking students in regulations banning
discrimination based on national origin).
214. See Memorandum from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Heads of Departments and Agencies General Counsels and
Civil Rights Directors 2 (Oct. 26, 2001) (stating that Sandoval does not strike down Title
VI’s disparate impact regulations, and using the facts of Lau as an example of disparate
impact discrimination on the basis of national origin), available at
http://www.napalc.org/files/Boyd_Memorandum.pdf.
215. See Enforcement of Title VI, supra note 92, at 50,124 (noting that agencies that fail
to provide meaningful access may be discriminating on the basis of national origin in
violation of Title VI).
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emphasize funded agencies’ responsibilities to provide LEP individuals
with the same services as English-speakers.216 The Executive Order and
the DOJ hold USCIS to the same standards as funded agencies.217 In Lau,
the Supreme Court found that the lack of provision of language assistance
to LEP students effectively barred their ability to participate in the
curriculum.218 The Court reasoned that Chinese-speaking students were
likely “to find their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in
no way meaningful” in an English-only environment.219
Similarly, meaningful access in the VAWA context requires that all
eligible battered women are able to access immigration remedies; however,
USCIS’s current English-only administration of VAWA benefits denies
LEP women like May necessary information and effectively prevents them
from obtaining relief.220 In the case of VAWA, where LEP applicants like
May make up a large proportion of the population that needs to access
services,221 the dearth of translated materials and other linguisticallyaccessible services does not provide battered immigrant women meaningful
access to VAWA’s benefits.222

216. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs—Implementation of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2004) (prohibiting provision of
different services or providing services in a different manner); Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Race, Color, or National Origin in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal
Financial Assistance from the Department of Homeland Security, 6 C.F.R. § 21.5(b) (2004)
(mirroring DOJ regulatory language of 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) in DHS’s Title VI
implementing regulations); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1985)
(explaining how Title VI, Section 602 delegates determination of disparate impact
discrimination to a federal agency).
217. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (clarifying that while Title VI itself
only covers funded agencies, federally-conducted agencies are held to the same standards).
218. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564 (1974) (finding disparate impact
discrimination where students in some school districts did not receive language assistance in
violation of state guidelines).
219. See id. at 566 (rejecting the assertion that there could be equality of treatment for
LEP students where the school provided identical facilities, teachers, and curriculum, as
they did for English-speaking students).
220. Cf. Sula Pettibon, Meza Family’s Deaths Reveal Gaps in Domestic Violence
Services, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Aug. 15, 2004, at 1A (reporting that provision of
domestic violence outreach and legal services to Spanish-speaking women increased from
thirty-five cases in the first year to 300 cases in subsequent years when the agency made
Spanish
language
information
available),
available
at
http://www.herald
online.com/local/story/3744996p-3351426c.html.
221. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 258 (noting that 78.7% of the battered immigrant
Latinas surveyed spoke or read little or no English).
222. See Adamson, supra note 179, at 10A (quoting Kansas Supreme Court Chief Justice
saying that translated forms would help battered immigrant women understand how to
proceed legally in domestic violence situations); Lee, supra note 35, at 184 (arguing that in
order to ensure LEP clients have full access to legal services, providers should remove
structures, such as providing English-only information, that bar LEP clients from access).
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USCIS’s VAWA application numbers do not reflect the number of
eligible women

Application numbers are a starting point from which an agency can
determine the number or proportion of LEP persons who receive services
and the frequency with which the agency comes into contact with LEP
persons.223 However, the number of people who apply for services may be
different than the number of people who are eligible for services, but who
fail to apply.224 USCIS deals with an average of twenty-three VAWA
petitions per day.225 However, this number fails to include other contacts
with USCIS prior to filing the petition, such as phone inquiries, Website
browsing, or personal office visits.226 It also fails to include potential
applicants like May who, because of language barriers, do not learn about
and cannot access the services.227
Based on the annual number of binational marriages and estimated rates
of domestic violence, almost 75,000 battered immigrant women each year
may be eligible for VAWA benefits.228 Yet, USCIS processes around
6,000 VAWA claims each year,229 and does not compile any data on how
many VAWA applications come from LEP battered immigrant women.230
However, if VAWA applicant characteristics match those of the general
USCIS applicant pool, each year roughly 18,500 VAWA-eligible women
are LEP.231 Application numbers that do not adequately reflect the eligible
223. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,45960 (outlining two of four elements of the DOJ’s test for Title VI compliance).
224. See id. at 41,463 (noting that lack of awareness of a program denies LEP
individuals meaningful access).
225. See AILA INFONET, DHS ANSWERS QUESTIONS ON VAWA PETITIONS AND
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS, AND ON U PETITIONS, at http://www.aila.org/infonet (last visited
Sept. 6, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) [hereinafter AILA]
(reporting that in 2003, USCIS received 6,700 self-petitions, up from 5,922 the previous
year).
226. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., USCIS PRIORITIZES BACKLOG
REDUCTION IN FY 2005 BUDGET (Feb. 2, 2004), at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/
publicaffairs/newsrels/backlogfy2005.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with the
American University Law Review) [hereinafter BUDGET] (calculating that each day USCIS
receives 100,000 Web hits, takes 50,000 calls at its National Call Centers, and sees 25,000
visitors at its district offices).
227. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 8, at 275 (calculating that almost one-quarter of abused
immigrant Latinas did not seek services because of English language problems); Pettibon,
supra note 220 (noting a ten-fold increase in the number of cases involving Spanishspeaking women once the agency instituted language-accessible services).
228. Compare Immigration & Naturalization Serv., supra note 7 (noting that the U.S.
admitted 294,798 spouses of USCs and 28,874 spouses of LPRs in 2002), and U.S. Comm’n
on Immigration Reform, supra note 5 (stating that approximately two-thirds of immigrant
spouses are female), with Dutton, supra note 8 (estimating that thirty-four percent of
immigrant women experience domestic violence).
229. See AILA, supra note 225 (noting that the annual number of self-petitions has
increased in past years).
230. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 43 (commenting that INS does not maintain
documentation on the language requirements of the people it serves).
231. Cf. id. at 35-36 (indicating that about twenty-five percent of all USCIS customers
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community provide evidence that the lack of language accessibility fails to
provide meaningful access to enable an LEP individual to take advantage
of services.232
The greater the number or proportion of LEP persons an agency serves,
the more likely it is that the agency needs to provide language services,233
and USCIS’s lack of LEP services negatively impacts the successful
implementation of VAWA’s objectives.234 In addition, the more frequently
the agency has contact with LEP individuals, the more likely it is that it
needs to provide language services.235 USCIS has failed to meet its
Executive Order 13,166 and implied Title VI obligations to provide
meaningful access to VAWA remedies for LEP applicants for whom
USCIS provides only English information236 and for the high number of
potential applicants who are unable to access VAWA due to language
barriers.237
An agency’s lack of action in spite of regulations and administrative
guidance suggesting action eviscerates the intent of Executive Order
13,166 to eliminate discrimination against protected groups.238 Thus,
USCIS’s provision of English-only VAWA materials, despite regulations
and guidance encouraging LEP-accessibility, contravenes the intent of the
Executive Order and its associated implied Title VI obligations.239 DHS
implementing regulations forbid the restriction of “the enjoyment of any
advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any . . . benefit under
the program.”240 DOJ holds federally-conducted programs to the same
speak Spanish and an additional two percent each speak Hindi, Chinese, Tagalog, and
Arabic).
232. Cf. Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1408 (11th Cir. 1993)
(describing plaintiffs’ argument that underutilization of a school resulted from the school
district’s refusal to distribute information).
233. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,459
(noting that agencies must include previously-excluded populations who are eligible for
services but cannot access services because of language barriers).
234. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(1) (noting that one of VAWA II’s objectives
was to remove immigration barriers that kept women in abusive relationships).
235. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,460
(noting that the agency should vary the level of service with frequency of contact).
236. See, e.g., Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(acknowledging that Title VI implementing regulations give an LEP person the right to
receive information in a language they understand).
237. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (finding that Title VI prohibits
use of English-only materials where it excludes LEP individuals from activities).
238. See Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 804 (noting that long-term noncompliance of
the agency with requirements for bilingual services, in violation of the Food Stamp Act and
its regulations, could show intent to discriminate against LEP recipients).
239. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 568-69 (emphasizing that the school district’s discriminatory
treatment of LEP students was against Congress’s Title VI intent to prevent taxpayer money
from facilitating discrimination).
240. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Race, Color, or National Origin in Programs
or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance from the Department of Homeland
Security, 6 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(1)(iv) (2004) (enumerating specific discriminatory actions
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standards as they hold their funded programs.241 Under DOJ guidelines,
USCIS should provide language assistance so as not to deny an LEP
battered immigrant woman like May effective access to VAWA
immigration benefits.242 This requirement would include translating “vital
written materials” into the language of each regularly encountered group.243
b.

The lack of translated forms inhibits LEP women’s ability to apply
for VAWA

No case explicitly addresses the right of LEP individuals to have routine
forms translated into a language they understand.244 However, a court
would likely defer to DOJ’s guidance to determine an agency’s
responsibility toward LEP individuals under Title VI and the Executive
Order.245 Under DOJ guidelines, USCIS’s administration of VAWA fails
to meet implied Title VI requirements because its translation policy fails to
provide “meaningful access” for LEP battered immigrant women like
May.246
The DOJ Policy Guidance describes a “safe harbor” provision whereby a
federally-funded agency can establish prima facie compliance with Title VI
by meeting two requirements: (1) providing translations of “vital
documents” for each LEP group that constitutes the lesser of five percent of
the eligible population or 1,000 individuals, and (2) providing written
notice, in a language the LEP recipient can read, that sight translation of
documents is available for language groups comprised of fewer than fifty
people.247 DOJ holds USCIS to the same obligations as its funded
agencies.248 Unfortunately, USCIS’s lack of required record-keeping about
prohibited by Title VI).
241. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal
language assistance plans be consistent with standards applicable to recipients of federal
funding).
242. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,461
(explaining that reasonable language accommodations must be timely, and provided so as
not to place a burden on the LEP person).
243. See id. at 41,464 (attempting to ensure effective LEP access to program materials
by establishing a bright line rule whereby DOJ will consider an agency in compliance with
Title VI if it translates vital documents for each LEP language group that constitutes five
percent of 1,000 of its clientele, and if it provides translated notice to others of the right to
receive sight translation of written materials in their own language).
244. But see Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(acknowledging plaintiffs’ claim that the agency violated Title VI regulations by sending
out materials in English only).
245. See Neal v. Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1999) (deferring to the
interpretation of Title IX provided in the guidelines of a compliance test developed by the
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 226 (2003).
246. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,46364 (providing guidance on how an agency should determine what “vital” documents it needs
to translate in order to be in compliance with Title VI).
247. Id. at 41,464.
248. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal
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which languages VAWA applicants and prospective applicants speak
hinders any accurate assessment of specific language translation needs.249
However, an application of general population language prevalence
estimates250 to the number of eligible LEP VAWA applicants on an annual
basis251 indicates that the lack of any translated version of Form I-360 can
be nothing but prima facie evidence that USCIS has not satisfied the “safe
harbor” requirements.252
The fact that Form I-360 is available only in English presents a
considerable barrier to May’s ability to access VAWA benefits.253 Such
barriers have failed to pass court scrutiny in the past. For example, in
Sandoval, the Department of Public Safety offered a driver’s license test in
English only.254 As a result, thousands of LEP Alabama residents had
difficulty getting a driver’s license and could not obtain employment or
other life essentials.255 By publishing Form I-360 in its current format,
USCIS has similarly failed to consider the demographics of the target
population and the negative impact of providing services in English only.256
USCIS’s failure to provide an essential VAWA document in translation
deprives LEP battered immigrant women of the opportunity to access
VAWA benefits equally.257 For a couple of hundred dollars per language,
USCIS could translate I-360 so that May, and others similarly situated,
would have access to the same information as English speakers.258 By
language assistance plans be consistent with standards for federal funding recipients).
249. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 43 (commenting on the general lack of INS
documentation regarding languages spoken by the people it serves).
250. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2000 2 (Dec. 2001) (calculating that fifty-one percent of the foreign-born
in the U.S. come from Latin America, one-quarter come from Mexico, with China and India
accounting
for
the
next
highest
numbers),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-206.pdf.
251. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (estimating that USCIS processes 6,000
VAWA applications each year); supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text (calculating that
there are 75,000 potential applicants and that approximately one-third of USCIS contacts are
LEP).
252. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,464
(listing the translation of vital documents as one of two requirements for establishing prima
facie compliance with Title VI).
253. Cf. Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an LEP woman failed to get legal
help because she could not fill out an English language restraining order form correctly).
254. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 489-90 (11th Cir. 1999) (comparing
accommodations the Department of Public Safety offered to other disadvantaged residents,
such as those who were deaf or illiterate).
255. See id. at 489 (stating that the policy affected some 13,000 residents, the vast
majority of whom were foreign-born).
256. See Dutton, supra note 8, at 262 tbl.2 (showing that almost half of all abused
Latinas had no English reading ability and almost three-quarters had little or none).
257. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1410 (11th Cir. 1993)
(asserting that an agency’s failure to share information with the public gives rise to an
inference of a discriminatory motive).
258. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 36 (reporting that in 2000, estimated
translation costs were $189 to $214 per document).
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providing I-360 in English-only, USCIS demonstrates its lack of concern
with its implied Title VI obligations and its blatant disregard of the
guidance provided by the DOJ balancing test.259
c.

USCIS’s evidence requirements bar meaningful access

Similarly, the VAWA evidentiary procedure is confusing and
misleading, especially to a non-English speaker like May, and it impedes
LEP battered immigrant women’s abilities to access VAWA benefits.260
For example, to assert a VAWA claim, May must provide evidence that she
entered into the marriage in good faith, that John is a USC or LPR, that she
is a victim of extreme cruelty or abuse, and that she is of good moral
character.261 Form I-360 “encourages” May to submit various types of
acceptable credible evidence, including marriage certificates, utility
receipts, mortgage documents, police reports, affidavits, medical reports,
and bank records.262 In fact, May must submit evidence in order for USCIS
to consider her application and authorize the work authorization or welfare
benefits she needs to survive without John’s economic support.263 USCIS
does allow May to submit other credible evidence if she cannot obtain the

259. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,45961 (suggesting that, to determine its Title VI obligations to LEP individuals, an agency
consider the number of LEP persons who receive services, the frequency of contact, the
importance of the service, and resources). As of December 2001, USCIS had translated just
11 of its 123 public-use forms. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 36-37 (noting that
USCIS had translated 11 forms into Spanish and 8 of them into additional languages,
including some in Icelandic and Swedish). It appears to have translated an additional 3
forms since then. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FORMS AND FEES, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/ formsfee/forms/index.htm (last modified Feb. 4, 2005) (supplying
translated versions of forms G-14, G-731, and I-131) (on file with the American University
Law Review). However, seven of the forms listed in the OMB report are not available
online in translation, three of them have actually been removed from the website in the last
six months. See id. (providing links only to English versions of forms I-9, I-90, I-94, I94W, I-821, I-823, and I-855, which the OMB report indicated were available in
translation). When the visitor clicks on the English form name and scrolls down to the
bottom of the description of the form, she can determine if a translated version is available.
See id. In almost all cases, USCIS lists only an English version. See id. The lack of
multilingual forms, coupled with the English-only Website, renders much of the information
inaccessible to LEP populations in violation of Title VI. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3
C.F.R. 289 (2000) (reviewing Title VI requirements and requiring agencies to ensure they
“provide meaningful access” to LEP individuals).
260. See supra Part I.B (describing how May could not understand the customer service
line, Website, or application materials); cf. Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (detailing how a court
denied an LEP battered immigrant woman a restraining order because of procedural errors
she made in filling out the paperwork).
261. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503 (reviewing VAWA self-petitioning process and
evidentiary requirements).
262. See FORM I-360, supra note 56, at Instructions 2 (delineating requirements for
credible evidence determination).
263. See Immigration Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(6)(ii) (2004) (mandating that USCIS
can only make a prima facie petition determination if the applicant has fulfilled I-360
requirements and provided supporting evidence).
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specified items.264 Unfortunately, this fact is in a note separated from the
list of requirements by two pages of instructions relating to non-applicable
visa categories.265 Ultimately, such obfuscation frustrates the intent of
VAWA to provide a means by which battered immigrant women can
petition for immigration relief without having to involve their abusive
spouse.266
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that USCIS is in violation of
Executive Order 13,166. However, May’s options for enforcement of
USCIS’s obligations are limited.267 She cannot sue under Title VI because
a loophole allows federally-conducted agencies to be held to a lesser
enforcement standard than federally-funded agencies.268 She can likely
seek USCIS’s purely voluntary compliance through administrative
remedies to enforce its Executive Order obligations, but it is unclear how
successful this action would be.269 The next section explores whether May
has an alternative cause of action: to go to court and attempt to gain
judicial enforcement under an equal protection claim, based on implied
Title VI obligations.270
B. USCIS’s Intent to Discriminate Against LEP Battered Immigrant
Women Provides a Private Right of Action
Recently, district courts have found a cause of action where a federallyfunded agency fails to address a known disparate impact. The failure to
remedy the burden may indicate intentional discrimination against a
264. See FORM I-360, supra note 56, at Instructions 4 (allowing a self-petitioning
battered spouse to “submit any relevant credible evidence in place of the suggested
evidence”).
265. See id. (detailing required evidence and providing exception to credible evidence
submission requirements).
266. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,192 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (listing VAWA II’s attempts
to remove obstacles that hinder women from fleeing domestic violence and to reduce
circumstances in which the abuser can threaten the women’s immigration status).
267. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (discussing a gap in enforcement
where an administrative remedy is ineffectual, USCIS is not subject to Title VI, and courts
will not enforce Executive Order 13,166).
268. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (describing how Title VI only
covers federally-funded agencies and how administrative remedies are ineffectual).
269. See, e.g., Barbara Plantiko, Comment, Not-So-Equal Protection: Securing
Individuals of Limited English Proficiency with Meaningful Access to Medical Services, 32
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 239, 258 (2002) (arguing that administrative remedies are
insufficient to “remedy denial of meaningful access” to LEP patients in health care settings).
270. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (noting that Title
VI’s protection is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause); Elston v. Talladega
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 n.11 (11th Cir. 1993) (equating the analysis of
intentional discrimination under Title VI to an equal protection analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F.
Supp. 2d 486, 495-99 (D.N.J. 2003) (performing identical analyses for plaintiffs’ Title VI
and equal protection claims); see also Plantiko, supra note 269, at 259-68 (demonstrating
how a plaintiff could frame an equal protection argument using evidence of a Title VI
violation).
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protected class in violation of Section 601 and the Equal Protection
Clause.271 These courts are possibly showing a philosophical allegiance
with critics of the Supreme Court’s intent requirement who have argued
that “[t]he burden on those who are subjugated is none the lighter because
it is imposed inadvertently.”272 The following sections assert that USCIS’s
lack of accommodation for LEP battered immigrant women like May rises
to the level of intentional discrimination, and therefore justifies a private
right of action against USCIS for violating the Equal Protection Clause.
1.

Case law
An ongoing case in the District of New Jersey, South Camden Citizens in
Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,273 straddles
the Sandoval decision and provides a model for disparate impact and
intentional discrimination analyses under both Title VI and the Equal
Protection Clause.274 In South Camden, a citizen’s group alleged that
discriminatory processes permitted the placement of a cement factory in a
neighborhood where the residents were predominately of color.275 Prior to
Sandoval, the South Camden court found that the citizen’s group had
proved disparate impact discrimination by showing that, in violation of
agency regulations, a facially-neutral procedure had a discriminatory effect
on members of a group protected by Title VI.276 The court noted that this
showing constituted rebuttable prima facie evidence of discrimination for
271. See, e.g., S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (finding knowledge of, and lack of
action to prevent, disparate impact of factory placement as sufficient evidence of intent to
discriminate in violation of Section 601 and the Equal Protection Clause); see also
Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (acknowledging that
plaintiffs stated a claim for intentional discrimination in violation of Section 601 based on a
facially discriminatory policy). At this time, neither case is final nor is there any way to
predict whether or not an appellate court would agree with the district courts’ reasoning.
See infra note 288 (describing how parties are filing cross claims in South Camden); infra
note 292 (mentioning that the court certified a class of plaintiffs in Almendares).
272. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1519 (2d ed.
1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s focus on intent does not comport with the “concept
of equal justice under the law” inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
focus on intentional motivation to prove race discrimination fails to address the unconscious
racism embedded within governmental actions).
273. 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001), modified, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001),
rev’d, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 939 (2002), remanded to 254 F.
Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J. 2003).
274. See S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 495-99 (using the same analytical framework to
evaluate plaintiffs’ Title VI and equal protection claims).
275. See S. Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (explaining that the permit process
considered the technical emissions standards of factory placement, but not the racial
implications of cumulative environmental burdens).
276. See id. at 484-95 (addressing the adverse impact, disparate impact, and injury
causation of a factory in a minority neighborhood and determining it violated Section 602
regulations).
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which the factory had no substantially legitimate justification.277 The court
therefore granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs.278
After the Supreme Court ruled in Sandoval, the defendants submitted a
motion to the New Jersey court asking it to vacate its earlier opinion, but
the court declined to do so.279 The court reevaluated the South Camden
facts in light of Sandoval’s restriction of judicial remedies for disparate
impact claims. The court determined that the plaintiffs could enforce
Section 602 by invoking 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,280 which prohibits state
actors from depriving persons of their legally-secured rights.281 However,
on appeal, the Third Circuit held that an administrative regulation cannot
create a right enforceable under Section 1983 unless the interest is implicit
in the statute authorizing the regulation.282 Since Section 602 did not
reveal any congressional intent to create a private right of action,283 the
Third Circuit held that no agency regulations promulgated pursuant to
Section 602 can provide that right.284 Thus, the Third Circuit foreclosed
another avenue by which plaintiffs could assert a private right of action
under Title VI against federally-funded programs that have a disparate
impact on protected groups.285 Nevertheless, agencies still may prohibit
actions that would have a disparate impact on protected groups by issuing
regulations pursuant to Section 602.286 These regulations allow those
277. See id. at 496-97 (concluding that compliance with Environmental Protection
Agency guidelines did not establish that there was a substantial legitimate justification for
the choice of site because the guidelines did not require consideration of Title VI nondiscrimination factors).
278. See id. at 452 (remanding the case to the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection for reevaluation of the factory’s permits).
279. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505,
509 (D.N.J. 2001) (denying defendant’s motion because there were alternative legal grounds
on which to base the preliminary injunction).
280. See id. at 518 (relying on Third Circuit precedent that allowed plaintiffs to bring
Title VI disparate impact claims under Section 602 or under Section 1983). Justice Stevens
had suggested using Section 1983 as a course of action for Title VI disparate impact claims
in his dissent in Sandoval. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 299-302 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that precedent indicates that Section 1983 provides a
private right of action to enforce Title VI regulations against state actors).
281. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (granting a private right of action where a state actor
violates a person’s civil rights).
282. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790
(3d Cir. 2001) (remarking that the Section 602 regulations went beyond the congressional
intent of simply defining the rights outlined in Section 601).
283. See id. at 789 (citing Sandoval’s conclusion that Section 602 demonstrates an intent
only to place restrictions on enforcement, not to provide private rights for any class of
protected individuals).
284. See id. (noting that Section 602 limits agencies to effectuating rights that Section
601 had already created).
285. See id. at 774 (pointing out that Title VI proscribes only intentional discrimination,
and, in light of Sandoval, the plaintiffs do not have a right of action).
286. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,458
(declaring that Sandoval did not address the validity of agency regulations, promulgated
under Title VI, Section 602, that prohibit disparate impact discrimination).
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negatively affected to access an administrative remedy, even if they cannot
prove intent and file suit.287
On remand from the Third Circuit, the New Jersey district court revisited
the South Camden facts for the third time, now examining it in the context
of Title VI, Section 601 and the Equal Protection Clause. The court noted
that evidence of disparate impact alone is insufficient to meet the
heightened evidentiary burden of intentional discrimination.288 However,
the court recognized that disproportionate impact is often probative of
intentional discrimination.289 Among factors indicative of intent, the court
included: historical background of the action, the foreseeability of the
consequences of the action, the nature and magnitude of the disparity, and
knowledge that the action would cause a disparate impact.290 The court
used evidence of the agency’s knowledge of likely disparate health impact
to allow a claim that the factory’s facially-neutral practices were
intentionally discriminatory under Section 601 and the Equal Protection
Clause.291 Thus, as some courts interpret the law today, plaintiffs such as
May may be able to use evidence of disparate impact and of the
defendant’s knowledge of a likely adverse impact to prove discriminatory
intent.292
287. See Victor Goode & Phyllis Flowers, Invisibility of Clients of Color: The
Intersection of Language, Culture, and Race in Legal Services Practice, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV.: J. OF POVERTY L. & POL’Y 109, 113-15 (2002) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks
of pursuing an administrative solution rather than litigation for a language access complaint
under Title VI); Plantiko, supra note 269, at 246 (describing the DOJ’s administrative
enforcement procedures, which require an agency’s voluntary compliance to rectify its Title
VI violations).
288. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486,
495 (D.N.J. 2003) (stating that a party must allege “purposeful, invidious discrimination”).
The South Camden case is ongoing and there has been a flurry of cross claims and counter
claims in the last two years. See, e.g., Order, S. Camden, (Jan. 12, 2004) (No. 01-cv-702)
(dismissing multiple third-party complaints). The Final Pretrial Conference is scheduled for
June 2, 2005. See Scheduling Order, S. Camden, (Nov. 30, 2004) (No. 01-702-FLW-AMD)
(providing filing deadlines for plaintiffs and defendants).
289. See S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (quoting Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 563
(3d Cir. 2002) for the proposition that “people usually intend the natural consequences of
their actions”).
290. See id. at 496 (reviewing equal protection case law to determine relevant factors to
prove intent).
291. See id. at 497 (considering agency’s knowledge of the factory’s likely disparate
impacts on residents of color as a basis on which to state a claim of intentional
discrimination).
292. See Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (denying
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowing plaintiffs’ Title VI right of action
for intentional discrimination). The plaintiffs in the case of Almendares, low-income LEP
recipients of food stamps, argue that the Department of Job and Family Services
discriminated against them and obstructed their rights to participate fully in the federal food
stamp program by not providing materials in Spanish. Id. at 800. They argue that the
agency’s administration of the program intentionally discriminated against them on the basis
of national origin in violation of Title VI. Id. at 801. The district court acknowledged the
limitations imposed by Sandoval, id. at 802, but found that the plaintiffs arguably stated a
cause of action for intentional discrimination. Id. at 804. Notably, the court, drawing on the
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2.

USCIS intentionally discriminates against LEP battered immigrant
women
The text of VAWA clearly indicates congressional intent to provide
immigration remedies for May and women similarly situated.293 Likewise,
the text of Title VI clearly indicates congressional intent to eliminate
discrimination based on national origin.294 Title VI itself applies only to
federally-funded agencies;295 however, Executive Order 13,166 holds
federally-conducted agencies to the same Title VI standards as the agencies
they fund.296 Under Title VI jurisprudence, national origin discrimination
encompasses discrimination on the basis of language.297 Thus, USCIS
violates the spirit and plain language of Executive Order 13,166 (and
associated implied Title VI obligations) where its failure to provide
bilingual services discriminates against LEP applicants.298
a.

USCIS knowingly failed to comply with obligations imposed under
Executive Order 13,166

USCIS has known about its implied Title VI obligations, as clarified
under Executive Order 13,166, for at least four years.299 USCIS’s standard
reasoning of South Camden, acknowledged the plaintiffs’ claim that the long-term
noncompliance of the agency with requirements for bilingual services, in violation of the
Food Stamp Act and its regulations, could show intent to discriminate against LEP
recipients. Id. at 807. The case is ongoing, and the court has certified the class of plaintiffs.
See Order at 6, Almendares (July 16, 2004) (No. 3:00CV7524) (finding that plaintiffs met
requirements as class representatives to seek equitable relief for alleged discrimination
based on national origin in violation of Title VI). The parties appear to be making efforts to
reach a settlement agreement. See Third Narrative Settlement Statement of Defendant Ohio
Department of Job and Family Services at 1, Almendares (Feb. 1, 2005) (No.
3:2000CV7524) (noting that Defendants are reviewing the settlement options); Plaintiffs’
Settlement Status Report at 2, Almendares (Feb. 1, 2005) (No. 3:00CV7524) (stating that
Plaintiffs believe there is agreement on major issues).
293. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502 (defining VAWA’s purpose as to “offer
protection against domestic violence” in light of findings that immigration laws acted as a
barrier that kept battered immigrant women “locked in abusive relationships”).
294. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of . . . national origin . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
295. See id. (limiting the prohibition against discrimination to programs receiving
“Federal financial assistance”).
296. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (specifying that federally-conducted
agency language assistance plans “must be consistent with the standards applicable to
recipients of federal financial assistance”).
297. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (including disparate impact based on
provision of English-only services to Chinese-speaking students in regulations banning
discrimination based on national origin); Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000)
(reviewing Title VI requirements and requiring agencies to ensure they provide “meaningful
access” to LEP individuals).
298. See, e.g., Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(finding that failure to provide bilingual outreach services had a disparate impact on LEP
Food Stamp applicants).
299. See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,125 (Dep’t of Justice Dec. 6,
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operating procedure denies May meaningful access to VAWA services and
is in contradiction with Executive Order 13,166 and the DOJ Policy
Guidance.300 A court could construe USCIS’s behavior to be indicative of
intent to discriminate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.301 For
example, USCIS’s willful failure to comply with implied Title VI
mandates, and its denial of required meaningful access to its services for
LEP individuals, is evidence of intent to discriminate.302 Thus far, USCIS
has failed to issue even a plan listing its efforts to guarantee meaningful
access to LEP applicants.303 An agency’s failure to share basic information
about its programs with protected groups raises questions about its
discriminatory intent.304 Such lack of attention is particularly suspect for a
federally-conducted agency whose primary function is to work with
immigrants and foreigners, a group likely to contain a high proportion of
LEP individuals.305
b.
of

Disparate impact on LEP battered immigrant women is probative
USCIS’s discriminatory intent

USCIS has a legal obligation to provide LEP battered immigrant women
like May meaningful access to VAWA remedies.306 Its knowing non2000) (deferring comment on issues of language access issues because the INS planned to
address them later “in compliance with Executive Order 13,116”).
300. Cf. Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (inferring agency’s discriminatory intent
from its failure to implement bilingual programs required by Title VI and its implementing
regulations).
301. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26668 (1977) (noting that impact alone is not sufficient to prove an equal protection violation,
and the court should also consider historical background and the administrative history of
the action to establish intent).
302. See Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 804 (positing that long-standing noncompliance
with a known law and implementing regulation shows intent to discriminate).
303. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., AGENCY SPECIFIC MATERIALS, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/agency.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (on file with the
American University Law Review) (providing hyperlinks to published federal agency LEP
plans and lacking a link to a DHS plan that would cover USCIS).
304. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1410 (11th Cir. 1993)
(noting a school’s failure to notify minority parents of a school building project in a white
neighborhood might indicate discriminatory intent in some circumstances).
305. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENTAL PLAN IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER
13,166 (Jan. 10, 2001) (noting that agencies that have “frequent, if not daily, contact with
LEP individuals concerning matters of significant importance” must ensure that those
served
can
access
the
services
offered
meaningfully),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/lep/dojimp.htm (on file with the American University Law
Review).
306. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(2) (noting that one purpose of VAWA is to
protect immigrant women from domestic violence); Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title
VI, § 602 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (authorizing agency regulations to prohibit
discrimination that Section 601 does not cover specifically); Nondiscrimination in Federally
Assisted Programs—Implementation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.104(b) (Dep’t of Justice 2004) (prohibiting actions by DOJ agencies that adversely
impact accomplishing program objectives with proscribed groups).
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compliance gives rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.307 In
South Camden, the New Jersey District Court required the plaintiffs to state
a claim that the agency had implemented a facially-neutral policy
“‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.”308 However, the court rejected the agency’s argument
that, even if it displayed indifference to potential negative consequences,
there was no proof of intent to discriminate,309 and accepted the plaintiffs’
claims that the agency actions demonstrated discriminatory animus.310 The
court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ allegations that the placement of the
factory had a disparate impact on residents of color were both relevant and
probative of the defendant’s discriminatory motive.311
Similarly, under its current mode of operation, USCIS denies May and
other LEP battered immigrant women a meaningful opportunity to access
VAWA information312 and to apply for immigration benefits.313 USCIS’s
implied Title VI obligations are clear,314 yet it has failed to act upon those
obligations. USCIS’s indifference and avoidance of its Executive Order
responsibilities allow an inference that it intended to discriminate against
LEP applicants.315 In addition, USCIS’s current policies endorse the
pervasive lack of multilingual services offered to prospective VAWA
applicants and fail to ensure meaningful access to services for May or any

307. See Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 807 (finding non-compliance with known laws
requiring LEP accessibility as indicating intent to discriminate in violation of Section 601).
308. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486,
495 (D.N.J. 2003) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979))
(recognizing that Section 601 and equal protection claims require “purposeful, invidious
discrimination” against the plaintiff).
309. See id. at 496-97 (noting that the burden shifts to the defendant to refute the
allegations once the plaintiffs have established discriminatory intent).
310. See id. at 496 (observing that the court could infer discriminatory intent from
historical background, departures from usual procedure, and foreseeable negative
consequences).
311. See id. at 497 (noting that a defendant’s knowledge of disparate impact, historical
practices, and situational specifics is sufficient to state a cause of action under Section 601).
312. See supra Part I.B.1 (describing linguistic barriers to accessing basic VAWA
information).
313. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing linguistic barriers to applying for VAWA benefits).
314. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national
origin); Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federally-conducted
agencies to provide LEP individuals with equivalent services to those provided to English
speakers); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, at ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal
language assistance plans be consistent with standards applicable to recipients of federal
funding).
315. See Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (positing
that long-term noncompliance with requirements for LEP services, in violation of known
legal obligations, could show intent to discriminate). The government’s history of
discriminatory administration of immigration benefits strengthens the inference of intent in
this case. See sources cited supra note 18 (discussing past immigration policies that had a
discriminatory effect on women and people of color).
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battered immigrant woman who does not speak English.316 In the case of
USCIS, an agency with extensive contact with LEP populations, where the
result of lack of language access is as severe as deportation or severe
injury, such lack of attention to language barriers rises to the level of
“invidious discrimination on the basis of national origin and race.”317
Thus, USCIS’s failure to serve those disadvantaged on account of national
origin indicates its unlawful discriminatory intent.318
Under a South Camden analysis, USCIS’s facially-neutral evidence
procedure disproportionately affects May because it fails to consider the
particulars of her situation.319 In South Camden, the New Jersey District
Court noted that race-neutral permitting procedures resulted in
discriminatory placement of factories in residential communities of
color.320 A new factory would affect the residents’ health, which, when
added to the cumulative effects of other community-specific environmental
factors, constituted an adverse impact.321 The court concluded that the
factory’s placement had a disparate impact in violation of Title VI because
statistical evidence showed that companies frequently placed new factories
in areas where the residents were largely of color.322 Thus, the district
court used a “totality of the circumstances”323 test that took into
consideration community-specific harms.324
Similarly, the totality of May’s circumstances illustrates that USCIS’s
316. Cf. Louise Chu, Rise in Immigrant Domestic Abuse Cases Reflects Better Outreach,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 16, 2003 (reporting that a thirty percent increase in LEP
domestic violence cases resulted from improved outreach to immigrant populations),
available at http://www.charlotte.com/mid/observer/news/local/ 5881323.htm.
317. See Enforcement of Title VI, supra note 92, at 50,123-24 (noting that xenophobic
prejudice may trigger language discrimination).
318. See, e.g., Connie Paige, Out of China: A Woman’s Story Lifts Veil on Once-Taboo
Topic, BOSTON GLOBE (City Weekly), Nov. 16, 2003, at 1 (reporting on cuts in immigrant
domestic violence services and quoting sources who feel that “government programs should
do more to respond to” the deficient supply of immigrant services).
319. Cf. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446,
483 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding that a facially-neutral permit procedure disproportionately
affected citizens of color because it failed to consider the particulars of their situation).
320. See id. at 484 (acknowledging that the defendants followed government guidelines
in determining the location of the factories at issue).
321. See id. at 490 (requiring defendants to consider external sources of pollution to
determine whether or not the placement of a new factory would have an adverse impact on
the community).
322. See id. at 492-93 (“[I]n the State of New Jersey there is ‘a strong, highly statistically
significant, and disturbing pattern of association between the racial and ethnic composition
of communities, the number of [Environmental Protection Agency] regulated facilities, and
the number of facilities with Air Permits[.]’”).
323. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (describing how
discriminatory purpose can be inferred from “the totality of the relevant facts,” such as
where an action has a more severe impact on one group than another).
324. See S. Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (considering specific health problems within
the community, the environmental problems of the neighborhood, and the number of
existing industries that impose an environmental burden when assessing Title VI
compliance).
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actions discriminate against LEP battered immigrant women.325 While the
English-language evidentiary requirement theoretically applies to all
applicants for USCIS benefits,326 in practice it has an unlawful
discriminatory impact on those who are LEP as a result of national
origin.327 USCIS fails to consider that it is primarily LEP individuals who
will have documents needing translation, that translation imposes a
logistical and financial burden on LEP individuals, and that this
requirement may pose a barrier to assertion of a VAWA claim.328 Thus, in
light of the clear violation of the Executive Order and invidious intent to
discriminate, May is hoping that a judge will enforce USCIS’s obligations
to her.
C. Lack of Judicial Enforcement of “Meaningful Access”
Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause329 have much in common.330
Both are tools of anti-discrimination, introduced in response to an urgent
need to eliminate pervasive racial discrimination.331
Both protect
individuals from arbitrary government discrimination on the basis of
national origin.332 Key cases for both have involved discrimination in the
educational context.333 The Supreme Court has found both claims to
325. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text (describing the disparate impact of
USCIS’s facially neutral procedures).
326. See Immigration Court—Rules of Procedure, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.33 (2004) (requiring
that all applicants who submit any foreign language document to USCIS shall also send a
certified English translation).
327. Cf. S. Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 483 (finding that a facially-neutral permit
procedure disproportionately affected citizens of color because it failed to consider the
particulars of their situation).
328. Cf. id. at 451 (noting that the factory failed to consider issues such as existing
emissions levels and the poor health of the community and finding these omissions provided
evidence of disparate impact discrimination).
329. The Supreme Court has applied Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees
to federal government actions via the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(barring a state from denying “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws”); id. amend. V (providing for due process to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life,
liberty, or property); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (extending equal
protection guarantees to federal acts because discrimination constitutes a deprivation of
liberty under the Fifth Amendment).
330. See John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implications for
Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1641 (2002) (arguing that the
structural schemes of Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment are indistinguishable).
331. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (stating that the “central
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause . . . is the prevention of official conduct
discriminating on the basis of race”), with President John F. Kennedy, Address to Congress
(Feb. 28, 1963) (noting that Title VI was needed because prior legislative and constitutional
attempts
had
not
ended
racial
discrimination),
available
at
http://www.congresslink.org/civil/cr1.html.
332. Compare Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (finding equal protection
applied to Chinese citizens who were “within the territorial jurisdiction” of the United
States), with Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d) (barring discrimination on the basis of “race, color, or national origin”).
333. Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially-
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require proof of intentional discrimination334 and that the means by which a
plaintiff can prove a violation of either is functionally identical.335 Courts
employ a “burden shifting” mode of analysis for both claims prior to
striking down the challenged action.336 Both have been extended to cover
the federal government’s own activities in recognition that the federal
government should not be allowed to discriminate in a manner prohibited
to others.337
However, one key difference between the two analyses is how courts
have regarded the interconnection of national origin and language.338 The
Supreme Court has established that LEP status is a component of national
origin under Title VI.339 The Supreme Court, though, has declined to reach
the issue in its equal protection jurisprudence.340 In equal protection
analyses, courts “apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of

segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause), with Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974) (finding that English-only school programs violated Title VI).
334. Compare Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (observing that disproportionate impact does not
prove a law violates the Equal Protection Clause in the absence of a discriminatory
purpose), with Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (restricting plaintiffs to a
cause of action proving intentional discrimination in violation of Section 601 and
eliminating any right of action to enforce disparate impact discrimination under Section
602).
335. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (noting that Title
VI’s protection is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause); Elston v. Talladega
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 n.11 (11th Cir. 1993) (equating the analysis of
intentional discrimination under Title VI to an equal protection analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F.
Supp. 2d 486, 493-99 (D.N.J. 2003) (considering plaintiffs’ Title VI and equal protection
claims together). Compare Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 267-68 (1977) (discussing evidentiary sources such as legislative history that can help
prove discriminatory intent in equal protection claims), with S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at
496 (requiring similar evidentiary sources for a Title VI claim to those noted in Arlington
Heights).
336. Compare Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 566 n.21 (stating that once plaintiffs have
made a threshold showing of discriminatory intent, the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that the same decision would have resulted even had it not considered the
impermissible purpose), with S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (employing the Arlington
Heights burden-shifting test as part of a Title VI analysis).
337. Compare Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (finding that equal protection
applies to federal actions by way of the Fifth Amendment because “discrimination may be
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”), with Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R.
289, § 1 (2000) (noting that the federal government has an obligation to ensure accessibility
for LEP individuals to its own services, as well as those of its funded programs previously
covered by Title VI).
338. See generally Plantiko, supra note 269 (making Title VI and equal protection
arguments on behalf of LEP patients seeking interpretation services at federally-funded
hospitals).
339. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (finding English-only educational
programs for Chinese-speaking students was a form of national origin discrimination under
Title VI).
340. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (declining to decide
whether striking a prospective juror on the basis of Spanish language ability was a pretext
for ethnic discrimination).
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classifications.”341 Courts designate certain groups as “discrete and insular
minorities”342 based on their racial or national origin status and apply strict
scrutiny when examining acts that discriminate against them.343 Courts
afford other classifications, such as gender or economic status, either
intermediate scrutiny344 or rational basis scrutiny.345 The degree of scrutiny
that a court would apply to May’s claim remains unclear.346 Lower courts’
equal protection analyses have generally refused to recognize the
intertwined relationship of language and national origin and have applied
rational basis scrutiny to such claims.347 The lack of agreement on the
interconnection of language and national origin discrimination insulates
agencies like USCIS from a judicially-enforceable legal obligation to
provide meaningful access to battered immigrant women like May outside
of a due process analysis.348
Once May has stated a cause of action against USCIS for intentionally
discriminating against her, the burden shifts to USCIS to provide a
rationale for its discriminatory actions.349 USCIS is likely to advance the
same cost and administrative rationales as it would under the third prong of
the Fifth Amendment due process test established in Mathews.350 In both a
341. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discussing situations under which
courts require increased judicial scrutiny).
342. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
343. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting that classifications
drawn on the basis of race could only be upheld if “necessary to the accomplishment of
some permissible [government] objective”).
344. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (striking down gender-based
polices unless they “serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related
to achievement of those objectives”).
345. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of discriminatory economic policies that were rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose).
346. See Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 305 (1992) (noting that “language use
by minority language groups has not yet been situated within the framework of legal
standards which control the application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment”); id. at 304-10 (discussing situations in which strict, intermediate, or rational
basis scrutiny might apply to language minorities).
347. See, e.g., Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 801 (9th Cir. 1985) (reviewing past
precedent and determining that “a language-based classification is not the equivalent of a
national origin classification, and does not denote a suspect class”).
348. Compare Justin B. Denton, Comment, Protecting Both Ethnic Minorities and the
Equal Protection Clause: The Dilemma of Language-Based Peremptory Challenges, 1997
BYU L. REV. 101, 120-23 (arguing that courts should not extend strict scrutiny based on
language because language minorities do not have a history of discrimination and language
classifications are relevant to state interests), with Juan F. Perea, Buscando America: Why
Integration and Equal Protection Fail To Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 142638 (2004) (describing how equal protection jurisprudence ignores the intertwined nature of
discrimination on the basis of language and race for Latinos/Latinas).
349. See, e.g., S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp.
2d 486, 496 (D.N.J. 2003) (shifting the burden to the factory to show that the same decision
would have resulted in the absence of a discriminatory animus after the citizens group had
proved intent).
350. See supra Part II.C.1 (applying the Mathews three-prong test to assess May’s due
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due process and equal protection context, USCIS’s justifications are
unavailing. Under a strict scrutiny equal protection analysis, USCIS’s
justifications are likely insufficient to show that its current administration
of VAWA is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.351
However, the Supreme Court has only established a direct correlation of
nationality and language in its Title VI jurisprudence, not in the equal
protection context.352 Thus, courts may review May’s claim under a less
than strict scrutiny standard, possibly even under the rational basis
standard, which would make it easier for USCIS to prevail over a challenge
to its practices.353
Under a rational basis standard, the policy need only rationally relate to a
legitimate government purpose in order to withstand legal challenge.354
Courts frequently defer to policies that could be associated with the federal
government’s plenary powers over immigration.355 However, Congress has
clearly spoken about providing battered immigrant women with an
immigration remedy in VAWA,356 and the language policies at issue do not
implicate May’s eligibility to stay in the United States.357 The failure of
process right to adequate notice of VAWA remedies).
351. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954) (finding that a policy of
segregating schools failed to meet strict scrutiny because there was no compelling state
reason for racial discrimination).
352. Compare Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (affirming the prohibition of
language discrimination as a form of national origin discrimination under Title VI), with
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (declining to decide whether striking a
prospective juror on the basis of Spanish language ability was a pretext for racial
discrimination subject to strict scrutiny). The Supreme Court seems to struggle with how to
compare language minorities with other protected groups instead of reviewing the history of
discrimination and unequal treatment of LEP individuals on its own merits. See, e.g.,
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (“It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some
communities, that proficiency in a certain language, like skin color, should be treated as a
surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.”).
353. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.1,
at 645-46 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that the burden of proof rests with the challenger under
rational basis review, and that courts strike down few laws under this “enormously
deferential” standard).
354. Compare Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 (1979) (upholding a citizenship
requirement for public school teachers as rationally-related to state interests in promoting
civic virtues), with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding a state provision
denying protection on the basis of sexual orientation unconstitutional under a rational basis
standard).
355. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (upholding denial of
Medicare benefits to certain non-citizens in recognition of Congress’s ability to make
different rules for citizens and non-citizens under its “broad power over naturalization and
immigration”). See generally Michele E. Kenney, A Pitfall of Judicial Deference: Equal
Protection of the Laws Fails Women in Lewis v. Thompson, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 525
(discussing how deference to Congress’s plenary powers negates equal protection
guarantees for non-citizens).
356. See VAWA II, supra note 2, Title V, §§ 1503-1504 (providing self-petitioning and
cancellation of removal immigration remedies for battered immigrant women).
357. See, e.g., id. § 1503(b)(1) (describing an eligible woman as one who was married in
good faith and was battered, but not specifying that she must speak English to qualify).
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USCIS to follow the Executive Order and the DOJ Guidance eviscerates
this congressional intent by excluding thousands of potentially eligible
women from remedies because they do not speak English.358 A court could
see any cost or administrative justification for USCIS’s failure to
implement congressional policy,359 or even to comply with simple
recordkeeping tasks to determine the extent of the problem,360 as a pretext
for discriminatory actions.361 However, because of the lack of clarity
regarding the level of scrutiny the court would employ, it is unclear
whether May would be successful in attempting to judicially enforce
USCIS’s obligations, even with persuasive evidence that USCIS’s Englishonly administration of VAWA is contrary to the intent of Executive Order
13,166 and has a discriminatory impact on her.
The Equal Protection Clause court decisions are inconsistent with the
plain language of Executive Order 13,166, which recognizes the need to
extend protection to language minorities because LEP status results from
national origin.362 The federal government has publicized the assumed
correlation in a “Know Your Rights” brochure for LEP individuals which
states: “Sometimes, when a government agency or an organization does
not help you because you are LEP, they violate the law. This is called
National Origin Discrimination.”363 Thus, the intent of the Executive Order
and the federal government is to extend protection to LEP individuals,
regardless of who provides the services.364 It is reasonable to assume that
the government expects federally-conducted agencies such as USCIS to
follow the requirements of the Executive Order,365 and it is similarly
reasonable to assume that May should have a means by which to enforce
such protections.366
358. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (describing how USCIS processes
6,000 VAWA claims per year, whereas 75,000 women are likely eligible).
359. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (rejecting arguments about possible
cost impacts of translation as part of a due process analysis).
360. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 43 (commenting that INS does not maintain
documentation on the language requirements of the people it serves).
361. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federal agencies to
provide LEP individuals with equivalent services to those provided to English speakers);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (clarifying that while Title VI itself only covers
funded agencies, federally-conducted agencies are held to the same standards).
362. See Exec. Order No. 13,166 (requiring improved access “for persons, who, as a
result of national origin, are limited in their English proficiency”).
363. See FED. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY, supra
note 150 (describing possible violations of Title VI for LEP beneficiaries).
364. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, §§ 2-3 (applying similar obligations toward LEP
individuals on federally-conducted agencies as Title VI imposes on federally-funded
agencies).
365. See Ostrow, supra note 107, at 660 (noting that Executive Orders have the force and
effect of law).
366. See, e.g., id. at 687-88 (arguing that courts should enforce Executive Orders
because of the growing importance of “presidential legislation”).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The current funding for VAWA expires in 2005.367 Congressional intent
was to provide immigration relief to immigrant women like May who were
As Congress drafts the
battered by LPR or USC husbands.368
reauthorization, it should consider closing the loophole that enables USCIS
to avoid judicial enforcement of its obligations to provide LEP services to
battered immigrant women.369 For example, Congress could insert
language similar to that of Executive Order 13,166 into the BIWPA section
of VAWA and require USCIS to administer the program in a manner that
ensures it is accessible to all VAWA-eligible women, irrespective of
language.370 Alternatively, Congress could earmark funds to provide
linguistically-tailored services to enable the intended beneficiaries to access
the benefits it granted.371 Some domestic violence agencies are accessing
VAWA funding to enable provision of LEP services already,372 and federal
line-item funding would likely encourage other organizations, government
and non-profit, to improve LEP services.373 Depending on which agency
VAWA authorizes to distribute the funds, this may also have the interesting
side-effect of making USCIS a “federally-funded” agency directly subject
to Title VI and its associated cause of action.374
Even in the absence of line-item funding, USCIS has a legal and ethical
obligation to ensure that May, and LEP battered immigrant women
367. See VAWA II, supra note 2 (reauthorizing VAWA funding until 2005).
368. See supra Part I.A (enunciating one purpose of VAWA I and VAWA II as enabling
women to leave abusive relationships without fear of immigration consequences).
369. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (noting that there are limited ways
in which May can assert a cause of action against a federally-conducted agency for failing to
provide LEP services). A more permanent option would be for Congress to amend Title VI
to expand its coverage to both federally-funded and federally-conducted programs. Cf.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)) (extending prohibitions on racial
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to federal employers after
Executive Orders forbidding discrimination had proved ineffective).
370. Cf. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (noting that “each Federal agency
shall examine the services it provides and develop and implement a system by which LEP
persons can meaningfully access those services consistent with, and without unduly
burdening, the fundamental mission of the agency”).
371. Cf. VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1512 (providing line-item grants to provide battered
immigrants with access to services and legal representation for VAWA law enforcement and
prosecution, and rural and campus outreach programs).
372. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 755(e) (West 2004) (noting that funding for LEP
services for hearings related to domestic violence comes from state agencies’ VAWA
funding).
373. See Paul M. Uyehara, Making Legal Services Accessible to Limited English
Proficient Clients, 17 MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J., Spring 2003, at 33, 37 (noting costs of
$1,500 per month to provide language services at a legal clinic in Philadelphia), available at
http://www.lri.lsc.gov/pdf/03/030063_uyeharamie.pdf.
374. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d) (barring agencies receiving federal funding from discriminating on the basis of
national origin).
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generally, can access VAWA immigration benefits.375 This obligation to
comply with Title VI mandates (implied through Executive Order 13,166)
is stronger in the wake of Sandoval.376 The DOJ has articulated, in
considerable detail, the steps needed to solve USCIS’s most obvious
violations of Executive Order 13,166.377 For example, USCIS should
reengineer its Website to contain easily-accessible information in multiple
languages on VAWA, application procedures, and the Hotline.378 At the
very least, USCIS should enable one-click translation of all Website
content, providing a direct link to a machine translation Website to provide
instant translation of the page.379 It should direct prospective VAWA
applicants’ inquiries to a special customer service line and ensure that it has
multilingual capabilities (for example, pre-recorded translated messages
and effective access to telephone interpretation).380 USCIS should create
and distribute informational material on VAWA remedies written in plain
English and translated into the languages spoken by eligible populations, in
order to educate potential applicants.381 USCIS should also simplify the
English version of Form I-360 and translate it into the languages most
commonly spoken by foreign-born spouses.382 And, USCIS should provide
translation of evidentiary submissions for women who have a financial
375. See Uyehara, supra note 373, at 37 (comparing using the absence of funding as an
excuse for not providing equal services to LEP clients to feeling comfortable with private
clubs restricted to white men).
376. See Note, supra note 212, at 1796-97 (advocating stronger administrative remedies
for disparate impact discrimination to replace diminishing rights for private enforcement of
Title VI).
377. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,45556 (providing evaluations of implementation procedures, including suggestions for
enhanced “recipient language assistance,” the use of “informal interpreters,” and “written
translation safe harbors”).
378. See, e.g., MID-VALLEY WOMEN’S CRISIS SERVICE, WELCOME (Mar. 2003), at http:
//www.mvwcs.com/ (providing professionally-translated information on domestic violence
services in English, Spanish, Russian, and Vietnamese from the agency’s homepage) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
379. Compare WASH. METRO. AREA TRANSIT AUTH., at http://www.wmata.com (last
visited Sept. 6, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (providing
information easily accessible to LEP customers by using clickable “flags” that trigger
automatic translations of text on the page), with TRANSLATION, supra note 46 (presenting
discriminatory barriers to accessing information by requiring users to read English
instructions, surf to another site, manually copy and paste text, and select source and target
languages from a list written in English).
380. Compare supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing how the National
Domestic Violence Hotline can access 139 languages), with supra note 42 and
accompanying text (noting that the USCIS customer service line is available only in English
and Spanish).
381. See, e.g., Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call
for Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 86 (2003) (recommending that
community organizations and the police develop multilingual outreach materials to inform
battered immigrant women of resources).
382. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,463
(recommending that an agency translate vital documents into the languages spoken by the
LEP groups with whom the agency has the most contact).
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need and are otherwise unable to obtain translation of materials.383
Finally, USCIS should undertake a public information campaign in
cooperation with community organizations to ensure that all foreign-born
spouses are aware that domestic violence is a crime and that USCIS
provides immigration relief for victims of that crime.384 This may involve
culturally-tailored community outreach (for example, posters in grocery
stores or flyers in churches) and a rethinking of immigration processes to
ensure that USCIS notifies women individually of their options, in a
language they can understand.385 This notification would serve two goals:
(1) to notify LEP battered immigrant women of VAWA remedies, and (2)
to expand enforcement beyond purely remedial assistance to LEP battered
immigrant women and improve awareness of the law, a goal that is more in
line with the overall preventive intent of VAWA.386
CONCLUSION
Title VI has been the law for over forty years.387 Congress passed
VAWA eleven years ago.388 Executive Order 13,166 and the DOJ Policy
Guidance have been in effect for almost five years.389 Yet, in violation of
these authorities, USCIS has failed to provide the most basic language
accommodations to one of the most vulnerable populations it serves: LEP
battered immigrant women asserting VAWA claims. By taking advantage
383. Cf. Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (reporting that an LEP battered immigrant woman
abandoned her efforts to apply for assistance because she had no friends able to translate for
her).
384. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,465
(emphasizing the importance of letting LEP persons know, in a language they understand,
that language assistance is available to help them access the services). There is precedent
for a government-mandated multilingual public awareness campaign for VAWA remedies.
See Mail-Order Bride Business, 8 U.S.C. § 1375(b)(1) (2000) (requiring international
matchmaking organizations to provide immigration information “in the recruit’s native
language,” including details of VAWA remedies for battered women). Such mandates
provide a civil cause of action for victims. See, e.g., Fox v. Encounters Int’l, 318 F. Supp.
2d 279, 296 (D. Md. 2002) (denying a motion to dismiss in favor of a Ukrainian woman
beaten by her USC husband after the matchmaking organization negligently failed to inform
her of her VAWA legal rights).
385. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,465
(suggesting working with stakeholders, placing notices in community newspapers, and
advertising on non-English language radio stations to publicize resources available to
battered immigrant women).
386. See ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DOMESTIC SOC. POLICY DIV.,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: HISTORY, FEDERAL FUNDING, AND REAUTHORIZING
LEGISLATION 1 (Oct. 12, 2001) (summarizing VAWA’s aims as “enforcement as well as
educational
and
social
programs
to
prevent
crime”),
available
at
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/women/violence/reports.htm.
387. See supra note 74 (noting that the Act became law in 1964).
388. See VAWA I, supra note 1 (expanding federal funding of violence against women
services starting in 1994).
389. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (detailing how the DOJ documents
clarified an agency’s Title VI obligations to LEP individuals under Executive Order
13,166).
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of a loophole in enforcement, USCIS has inverted the historical model
where federal agencies were leaders in encouraging others to adopt nondiscriminatory policies390 and is holding itself to a lower standard than it
would legally hold agencies to which it provides funds.391 USCIS should
fix its current lack of LEP-accessibility to comply with congressional intent
and ensure VAWA’s success,392 but more importantly, to enable scores of
LEP battered immigrant women to escape continued violence at the hands
of their USC and LPR husbands.

390. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000d) (1964) (implementing federal measures to reduce the states’ ability to
discriminate on the basis of race).
391. Compare Title VI, §§ 601-602, 78 Stat. at 252 (providing a private cause of action
against federally-funded agencies that violate its non-discrimination provisions), with Exec.
Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (providing no enforceable right of action against
federally-conducted agencies for violations).
392. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(2) (detailing one of VAWA’s purposes as
providing protection against domestic violence).

